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Problem description
In the specialization project (TDT4501) prior to this thesis, according to a previously es-
tablished framework, all in all, eight modeling techniques were investigated through a
synthesis of available literature, using published papers about and surveys of the relevant
modeling techniques. The results illustrated that both of these two categories modeling
initiatives have their advantages and disadvantages.
Purely analytical evaluations of modeling approaches will not always reflect their practical
usefulness. Hence it is important to complement such evaluations with empirical inves-
tigations, to see if advantages claimed analytically also come true in practice. Thus, the
objective of this master thesis project is to make an experimental comparison. Since such
comparisons are time-consuming it is not realistic to try out all the eight techniques that
were investigated analytically. Hence, two techniques will be chosen Secure Tropos and
Misuse Cases. These shall be compared in a controlled experiment to investigate:
1. The participants’ performance.
2. The participants’ preference for the two techniques.
Based on the results we will analyze whether the advantages and disadvantages claimed
from the analytical evaluation also were indicated in the experiment. It shall also be dis-
cussed whether the analytical and experimental evaluation together presents some ideas
for improvement of the two modeling techniques.
Assignment given: 15th. January 2012
Supervisor: Guttorm Sindre
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Abstract
In the course TDT4501 - Specialization Project - “ReqSec project”, the preparatory course
to this thesis, through purely analytical evaluation of the eight modeling approaches, the
advantages and disadvantages were illustrated based on the categories - i*-based modeling
approach and Use Case-based modeling approach.
However, only a purely analytical evaluation of the modeling approaches does not always
reflect their practical usefulness. Hence, the [motivation] of the thesis was selecting two
modeling approaches, those are Secure Tropos and Misuse Cases, using an empirical in-
vestigation for such evaluations to guide the researchers and practitioners a better overview
and understanding of the benefits of the two modeling approaches in a real life usage. The
objective was to see if the advantages claimed analytically in the previous project also
come true in practice. [Questions] Through a controlled experiment, two core problems
shall be investigated: a) How about the participants’ performance when they applied the
two modeling approaches to finish tasks in the experiment and b) Their preference for the
two modeling approaches after the experiment. The [principle] was using two modeling
approaches to perform the experiment, through the participants’ performance on the iden-
tified number of threats and mitigations for the experiment cases, and their perception of
the two modeling approaches by means of asking them to estimate the usage of model-
ing diagrams, textual description of cases, and memory in the experiment. And combining
with the evaluation of post-questionnaire analysis, the conclusions were summarized based
on the empirical study of statistical results and the previous analytical study results, to in-
vestigate whether the empirical evaluation could match well with analytical evaluation or
not.
[Contribution] The experiment project was the first time to compare the Secure Tropos
and Misuse Cases comprehensibly. The results illustrated that both modeling techniques
had no significant difference of identifying threats but they had significant difference of
identifying mitigations in this controlled experiment with 50 students who apply to both
modeling approaches with relevant cases. And through analyzing the same case with the
same modeling approach or different modeling approach of the experiment, it was found
that Net Shopping case was identified more mitigations and threats by the participants
when considering the aspect of technique criteria of threats and mitigations. The par-
ticipants were complementary regarding goal-based modeling approach in some security
issues and performed non-techniques threats and mitigations in this controlled experiment.
Hence, Secure Tropos was investigated perceiving more favorable. In the last, comparing
with the six dimensions from previous analytical comparison, the investigation shows that
most of the two modeling approaches’ advantages were confirmed, and the results also
coincided to the previous analytical evaluation.
Keywords: Secure Tropos, Misuse Case, Empirical Study, Security Modeling
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter gives an introduction to the thesis. Firstly, the problem definition and the
motivation behind exploring the problem were illustrated. And then come up with the
problem’s context. At the end of the chapter there was an outline of the rest of the thesis.
1.1 Problem description
Security is becoming more and more important in software systems in recent years. Hence
many techniques and methods were developed to support the secure systems engineering.
However, there is no clear guideline on what is the difference between these modeling
techniques: which one has what advantages and disadvantages, and why it is better than
other techniques in a specific scenario. Therefore, in order to realize the research purpose,
researchers and practitioners might struggle with the characterization of these modeling
approaches and tries to use each modeling approach in their research in order to figure out
the best and suitable one for their goals due to the fact that existing modeling approaches
have some similarities.
Hence, it is very important and useful to address clearly each modeling approach and to
help the researcher and practitioners solve this situation when they apply those relevant
modeling approaches in their objective cases. In the previous analytical comparison[54],
eight modeling approaches with disadvantages and advantages were presented according
to the classification framework for these modeling approaches[40]. However, whether
these findings claimed the same ideas in practice were still uncertain issues for research.
For instance, the previous work expressed six dimensions of characterization that were
based on purely analytical comparison[53]; it was lacking investigation of their practical
usefulness. Therefore, the two important modeling approaches (Secure Tropos & Misuse
Cases) were chosen to perform an experiment to see if the previous claim analytically also
come true in practice. The results of this empirical evaluation can provide practitioners and
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researcher a reference and a guideline of the two modeling approaches in case of avoiding
wasting time to choose relative approach in a really complex system analysis and design.
1.2 Research motivation
1.2.1 Purpose
The purpose of this master thesis project was to figure out whether the pervious analytical
comparison claim was also indicated in this empirical comparison. According to the ex-
periment results and its findings, a discussion based on the analytical evaluation can help
to conclude whether the advantages of the two modeling approaches were realized in prac-
tice and whether the analytical and experimental evaluation together presents some ideas
for improvement of the two modeling techniques.
1.2.2 Objective
The objective of this master thesis project was to make an experimental comparison.
Through the empirical comparison can be investigated whether the claimed findings and
conclusions coincided to the previous work by the way of investigating the participants’
performance and preference for the two modeling approaches. Thus, the thesis gave a
discussion of the ideas about the improvement of the two modeling approaches based on
the view of two modeling approaches’ advantages and disadvantages that claimed in the
analytical study and the empirical study.
1.3 Context
The objective method contains two well-known modeling approaches - Secure Tropos and
Misuse Case, with the focus on two special cases. Secure Tropos is normally good for
goal-based analysis and easily to find security concerns between each goal and soft-goal,
but it is also believed that the Misuse Case has a good ability to identify malicious act
against a system. Hence, there was an assumption that the two modeling approaches had
equal preference during the experiment as a condition at the beginning of the experiment
design.
This thesis has been carried out with the supervision of Professor Guttorm Sindre, at the
Department of Computer and Information Science at the Norwegian University of Science
and Technology (NTNU). The project was part of “ReqSec” project [12] that was lead by
Professor Guttorm Sindre of NTNU and Professor Andre Opdahl of UiB. The Research
Council of Norway finances the project from 2008-2012.
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1.4 Outline
The remainder of this thesis was organized in the following parts:
Preliminary Studies and Representation This contains background information of pre-
vious published papers and, state of art and the evaluation of approach before con-
ducting the experiment.
Experiment This contains the experiment, its objective, execution and aftermath.
Discussion This contains the findings after execution of the experiment. And combin-
ing of the previous analytical comparison and the empirical comparison, the ideas
of improvement for these two modeling approaches were presented regarding the
results of empirical study.
Conclusion This contains concluding remarks and points for future work.
Reference and Appendices This contains the reference used in the thesis, the documents
used in the experiment and the results. Also, a snapshot of published paper on an
international conference was attached at the end of the thesis.
3
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Chapter 2
Preliminary Studies
Even though most of the preliminary studies were conducted in the TDT4501 Special-
ization Project[54], but the most essential for understanding the content of the thesis was
repeated and expanded in chapter 2 and chapter 3. This chapter was the result of the liter-
ature study performed at the start of the project. It explained the general principles of re-
quirements engineering process, characteristics of the requirements, security requirements
engineering and some relevant empirical studies of modeling approaches for security re-
quirements engineering.
2.1 Requirements Engineering
2.1.1 Requirements Engineering Process
Software requirements engineering is the process of determining the features of the system
and other requirements from the customers. A requirements engineering process used for
requirements engineering vary widely depending on the application domain, the people
involved and the organization developing the requirements [7]. This process is regarded as
one of the most important issue of a software development because through this method
the software development team can decide precisely what should be build and what will
be built [7].
In general, this process is run as the stakeholders of the software to determine functional
and non-functional requirements, a close interaction between developers and end-users,
and finally expected software will be developed. In the entire development cycle, how-
ever, most people designed software is not considering security issues before the phase of
determining requirements or they always secure the security issues of the software after it
has been built. Thus, in some cases, software can be treated as a non-successful product
when it delivered to the end-users, such as mobile bank system, online transaction system
and so forth.
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2.1.2 Characteristics of Requirements
After the general concepts of the requirements process was clear, there might be a question
about what are the requirements must be. In general software development, the require-
ments must be [2]:
• correct, complete, consistent, non-ambiguous, verifiable and traceable.
1. Correct[2]: A requirement shall be correct if it describes something that a system
must match or a constraint on the way it must be done .
2. Complete[2]: A requirement is complete to the extent that all parts are present and
each part is fully developed. The requirement set is complete if it contains all of the
complete requirements.
3. Consistent[2]: A requirement is consistent if it does not conflict with another re-
quirement.
4. Non-ambiguous[2]: A requirement is non-ambiguous if there is only one interpre-
tation of its meaning.
5. Verifiable[2]: A requirement is verifiable if and only if there is a finite cost effective
process that a person or machine can use to check that the as built system meets the
requirement.
6. Traceable[2]: An analysis requirement is traceable if it can be traced backward to a
feasibility study, a white paper, meeting notes, or an interview. A design requirement
is traceable if it can be traced backward to one or more essential requirements.
2.2 Security Requirements Engineering
Software security requirements are defined as [23]:
“A security requirement is complementary to the functional requirement of a system. It
is a manifestation of a high-level organizational policy into the detailed requirements of
a specific system. Security requirements should be based on an analysis of the assets
and services to be protected and the security threats from which these assets and services
should be protected.”
Functional security requirement[32] is a capability or condition need in a system to control
or limit the fulfillment of requirements. And non-functional security requirement[32] is a
property of a system required to ensure fulfillment of requirements in the face of misuse
or abuse.
This approach covers a large scope of security requirements in[21]. For instance, the qual-
ity properties of requirements are: design independent, unambiguous, precise, understand-
able, traceable, verifiable, prioritized, complete, consistent, organized, and modifiable.
6
Firesmith defined that these quality properties of requirements can be categorized into
identification, integrity and privacy requirement[32]. For example, bank system users
must authenticate their password is a security requirement, and the bank system shall not
allow unauthorized individuals access to any communications is a privacy requirement.
There are several approaches to security requirements engineering handle requirement
phase tasks[62]. For instance, SQUARE, Charles Haley and his colleagues[23], Gus-
tav Boström and his colleagues[24], CLASP, Microsoft[48][57][44], Axelle Apvrille and
Makan Pourzandi[15], Eduardo Fernandez[30], Kenneth van Wyk and Gray McGraw[63],
and Gunnar Peterson[56]. All these approaches are focusing on specific issues. For ex-
ample, SQUARE is based on interaction between requirement engineers and the project
stakeholders. Boström and his colleagues suggest security requirements in agile develop-
ment with a focus on XP practices. Eduardo Fernandez and Gunner Peterson suggest use
cases as a starting point for identifying security requirements[30][56]. Kenneth van Wyk
and Gray McGraw prefer to use abuse cases to identify security requirements[63].
The MUC is an security requirements artifacts that can be used for eliciting security
requirements[59]. The approach is an extension of regular UML use case diagrams with
MUC that specify activity not wanted in the system. Secure Tropos is founded on the i*
modeling for agent-oriented software development. It can be used for modeling the se-
curity aspects of systems[66]. Other security requirements artifacts were also discussed
in[62], such as Abuser stories, attack trees and threat trees, soft-goal interdependency
graphs.
2.3 Modeling Techniques for Security Requirements and
Relevant Empirical Studies
Modeling techniques for the system development is an important vital ingredient (Bray
2002)[16]. System models are a very important bridge between the system analysis and
system design process. Combining different modeling techniques can also considerably
enrich system models and the system development. The system modeling techniques for
the requirements engineering can be divided into two half. One is based on internal model
where the process oriented, data oriented and process/data combination modeling tech-
niques are used to express the systems interaction functions, interaction objects and data-
flow between the functions[16]. And another one is based on external model where the
models are used for the system appearance and system behavior.
From the meaning of aspect of the model’s representation, if the representational mod-
eling provide snapshots of the system appearance, then the behavioral modeling really
defines the relationship between the input and output from the system. For instance, the
Use Case modeling technique is used for presenting what the system does and what the re-
lationship between the input and output of a system in the stage of functional requirements
desire(Bray 2002)[16].
Some relative works were done to compare the MUSD, MUCM, Mal-activity diagrams,
textual Use Cases for the empirical studies. Karpati and his colleagues performed an
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experiment to an visualizing cyber attacks with MUCM[41]. The experiment involved the
consideration of architectural context, using architecture with MUCM to investigate the
MUCM appearance; they found that MUCM can help the less experienced stakeholders to
gain an understanding of intrusion cases easily.
Vikash Katta et al [64] compared Misuse Sequence Diagrams (MUSD) and Misuse Case
Maps (MUCM) for intrusion visualization. They investigated MUSD and MUCM were
perform equally well in a controlled experiment, and the experiment participants were
prefer to use MUSD when they were complementary regarding architectural issues and
sequences of actions.
In 2010, an experimental evaluation of MUCM for eliciting SR were presented by Karpati
et al[55]. Through a controlled experiment they investigated that the participants signifi-
cantly better understanding of the intrusion and ability to identify mitigations when they
applied the MUCM. MUCM was better performed by the participants than those who ap-
plied to MUC with a system architecture diagrams to understand the intrusion. However,
both two modeling techniques were not perceived by their participants for the ease of use.
The empirical study of Misuse Case and Mal-activity Diagrams for modeling social engi-
neering attacks in 2011[39] solved one question that whether Mal-activity diagrams was
really more effective than Misuse Case for understanding social engineering attacks and
finding prevention measures. The results shows that both modeling techniques were per-
form equally well, only one small difference was the participants perceived mal-activity
was easy to use.
Stålhane et al[61] presented a controlled experiment to compare safety hazard identifi-
cation by means of Misuse Cases based on Use Case Diagrams and Textual Use Cases.
Although they explained that the Textual Use Cases were able to identify more failure
modes or threats in most cases due to the reason that the use case encourages analysts to
focus on threats related to the use case function of the system, they were still find Use Case
Diagrams and Textual Use Cases were equally easy to use from their experiment.
In the comparison of attack trees and misuse cases for security threat identification[14],
Opdahl et al cited that the attack trees have more effective for identify threats, especially
when there was no use case diagram was pre-drawn for the system to analyze. But the
investigation shows the participants had similar perception for the two techniques. The re-
searchers also suggested a way of threats categorization, but they did not mention how they
classified the threats into the sub-categories. So categorizing of the threats or mitigations
is still a tough task in the experiment until now, since the responses from the participants
might ambiguous in most cases.
As mentioned above, all of these empirical studies of security modeling were just cover
the Use Case-based modeling approaches but did not touch any i*- based modeling ap-
proaches. Thus, it was worthy to compare i*-based modeling approaches with the Use
Case-based modeling approaches. Hence, the rest of the project was focus on designing
an experiment to compare ST with MUC in order to cover i*-based modeling techniques
and the Use Case-based modeling techniques in empirical study of the security require-
ment modeling techniques field.
8
Chapter 3
Overview the Knowledge of
i*-based and Use Case-based
modeling Techniques
This section presents the characterization of i*-based and Use Case-based initiatives based
on a framework[40]. The framework was a product of a depth study of the literature review
about those were relevant for security modeling characterization in recent years[53]. The
rest section expressed the concepts of two modeling categories as it was presented already
in the previous project work[54] and the conference paper[53]. However, the purpose
of presenting here again was to review the fundamental concepts of relevant modeling
techniques before the empirical study of the two modeling approaches.
3.1 Goal-oriented Modeling Technique
In requirements engineering, a goal-oriented modeling approach has been recognized
to be useful on the design of information system, especially the internet applications
and web-based systems. Generally, goals present the objectives that the system should
achieve through the cooperation of actors in the system environment and in the system-
to-be[25]. The goal-oriented modeling can capture “why” data and functions of a system,
and whether they are suggest for achieving the high-level objectives that could be rise in
a requirements engineering process naturally[25]. The goal-oriented modeling approach
provides a criterion for requirements completeness, i.e., the requirements can be judged as
complete if they are sufficient to express the objectives that they are refining.
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3.2 i*-based Modeling Techniques
The i*-based modeling approach was developed for modeling and reasoning about or-
ganizational environments and their information systems[67]. The i* modeling covers
both actor-oriented and goal-oriented modeling techniques. It answers the question about
“why and who” in a system, but not including “what” in a system. It is suitable for an
early phase of system modeling in order to understand the problem domain[68]. Hence i*
modeling approach inherits the goal-oriented modeling approach features as well. There
are two main components of the i* modeling: 1) the strategic dependency (SD) model
is used to describe the dependency relationships among various actors in an organiza-
tional context[67]. 2) The strategic rationale (SR) model is used to describe stakeholder
interests and concerns, and how they might be addressed by various configurations of sys-
tems and environments[67]. The i*-based modeling techniques involve several modeling
approaches such as Secure Tropos (ST), Enhanced Secure Tropos (EST) and Secure i* .
Since just ST was selected for the experiment, thus its advantages and disadvantages based
on the previous work[54] were presented for later use in Chapter 10.
3.2.1 Secure Tropos modeling approach
Secure Tropos
Secure Tropos is based on the i*-based modeling framework for agent-oriented software
development. Secure Tropos is an extension of the Tropos methodology[34] that incorpo-
rates concepts for modeling the security aspects of systems. The key additional concepts
of Secure Tropos are:
1. Security Constraint: This is a restriction that is related to security issues, such as
privacy, integrity and availability, which can influence the analysis and design of a
multi-agent system being developed by Mouratidis [51].
2. Secure Dependency: This presents one or more security constraints that must be
fulfilled for a dependency to be satisfied[34].
3. Secure Entity: This represents any secure goal/task/resource of the system.
Therefore, the Secure Tropos process [46] also extends the Tropos process with phases to
analyze and model the new concepts. These activities produce different kinds of diagrams,
which are used as input to the later activities. The activities are: secure reference modeling,
security constraint modeling, secure capabilities modeling[26].
Figure 3.2 illustrates the notations[50] of the ST and an example[8] of ST diagram in figure
3.1.
Actor entities that have strategic goals and intentionality.
Goal an actor’s strategic interests.
Soft-goals goals without clear criteria whether they are satisfied or not.
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Figure 3.1: Full dependency links with a security constraint
Task represents at an abstract level, a way of doing something.
Resource represents a physical or information entity.
Dependencies indicate that one actor depends on another in order to attain some goals,
execute some tasks, or deliver a resource.
Figure 3.1 shows the full dependency link with a security constraint. Customer requires
DVD from the DVD store. Both customer and DVD store are actors in this case. Watch
movie is a secure goal. Customer is a depender with constraints to the dependee DVD
store. DVD store has the responsibility to keep the customer’s personal information private
and just could share the information only when consent is available.
3.2.2 Advantages of Secure Tropos
Representation perspective and level of abstraction Secure Tropos is typically goal-based
approach. The objective of Secure Tropos is to satisfy the security goals of a sys-
tem despite security constraints. Certainly, the security goals can be high level in
many cases[27]. Hence, this modeling technique can involve multiple stakeholders
in a system development, such as the project managers and end-users or those non-
technique professionals. This method would be easier for stakeholders to seek the
security concerns in an IT project.
Kind of security requirement engineering (SRE) tasks/activities There are seven sub-
classifications for SRE tasks/activities[40], security objectives, identification and
modeling of assets, identification of vulnerabilities and threats, elicitation and anal-
ysis of SRs, Specification of SRs, documentation of SRs and verification and val-
idation support. Secure Tropos can fulfill with security objectives, elicitation and
analysis of SRs, specification of SRs. It can do the high-level goals analysis and sub-
goals analysis that might be most important for customers, also have the ability to
derive security requirements from the other sources such as legislative request about
security, to analyze the security requirements to achieve complete and unambiguous
requirements[53].
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Figure 3.2: Tropos, Secure Tropos notation and Tropos concepts graphically
Technical criteria and specification criteria Secure Tropos have good “internal verifi-
cation support” except the “validateable” and “complete” specification criteria where
the ST just partially support these two criteria[53]. And for the other 5 criteria, e.g.,
requirements reuse, support for other development stages, help support and easy to
use, ST modeling technique has good ability on these specification criteria as well.
Modeling language, process and method ST modeling technique has good ability to “for-
mulate basic security requirements”, “usage scenarios”, “represent security mecha-
nisms” and low level security requirements[53]. There is a tool support to draw the
ST models[8]. It also has similarity with software specification languages and can
be used for the stages of software development. Most reusable artifacts can be used
during the early and late requirements[53].
Relevant SRE notation and software evolution and other perspectives ST covers the
basic notions of security requirements modeling, such as goal, soft-goal, security
feature/constraint and security entity. ST is catering the notion of risk and mitiga-
tion, also can specifically in security goal during the stage of software development.
The stakeholder is actor who can find threats, vulnerabilities and risk/mitigation in
the requirements engineering process of a software development stage[53].
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3.2.3 Disadvantages of Secure Tropos
Representation perspective and level of abstraction ST is typically goal-based approach,
where objective is to satisfy the security goals of a system despite security concerns.
But secure goals are in high level in many cases[27], hence it is not most appropriate
for analyzing low level security concerns.
Kind of security requirement engineering (SRE) tasks/activities ST cannot support the
criteria of “identification and modeling of assets” - the representation of entities that
are considered valuable, a possible target of the threats that should be protected[52][41]
[42]. It also cannot support “identification of vulnerabilities and threats” - the iden-
tification of software defects that can be exploited by an attacker to cause harm, and
what could be an attacker’s target[52] [41][42]. “Verification and validation support
(VVS)” is also cannot fulfilled as well - peer review, walk through, formal methods
or other verification and validation approaches that could be used to guarantee that
the security requirements are correct, complete, consistent and unambiguous[49]
[41][42].
Technical criteria and specification criteria ST has very good “internal verification sup-
port”, but bad “external verification support” for the specification criteria of “cor-
rect”. Specification criteria - “validatable” which is a sub-dimension of “External
verification support” of technical criterion is also cannot fulfilled. Another defect in
this dimension is the standards integration support for ST modeling technique, there
are understandable, consistent, verifiable and complete are just partially supported
in the technical criterion[53].
Modeling language, process and method ST modeling technique cannot fulfill with the
requirements of reusing the provided artifacts in later phase in this dimension of
“modeling language criteria"[53]. Only most ideas and concepts for ST are just
used during the early and late requirements process, and it is also no evidence that
ST can be used in the industry.
Relevant SRE notation and software evolution and other perspectives Unlike other i*
modeling approaches, ST embraces the notion of risk and mitigation. But ST has
no support for “component architecture” - the level of support for a component-
based structure that allows software modules to be added or removed with ease. ST
also has very low support for the “modularity”, “change propagation”, and “change
impact analysis” criteria in the software evolution support dimension.
3.2.4 Other i*-based Modeling Techniques
It is also valuable to present other i*-based modeling techniques. Those have high simi-
larities with ST. For instance:
1. Enhanced Secure Tropos is an extension of the Secure Tropos methodology. To
achieve this, the underlining i* ontology [46] on which the i*-based modeling frame-
work is based on was extended in order to fully model security. The approach [46]
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introduced an enhanced ontology with three main notions, namely ownership-used
to model the transfer of resources that an actor controls, delegation-used to model
the transfer of entitlements and responsibilities between actors, and trust-used to
model the belief of actors about the behavior of other actors, which together form
the very foundation of all security concerns.
Typically, delegation is defined as a relation between two actors called the delegator
and delegate, and a goal, task or resource called the delegatum. The two types
of delegation are delegation of execution and delegation of permission [21]. Also,
the notion of trust is used to differentiate delegation between trusted and un-trusted
actors. Trust is defined as a relation between two actors called the trustor and the
trustee, and a goal, task, or resource called the trustum. Again, the two types of trust
that are defined are trust of execution and trust of permission [21].
2. Secure i* is an extension of Yu’s i* modeling framework that is used for modeling
and analyzing security trade-offs [22]. It tries to align security concerns with other
equally important requirements such as usability, performance, and functional re-
quirements. The approach is based on a meta-model of security concepts containing
some important notions and their relationships [51].
The important notions are: actors, assets, threats, and vulnerabilities. All of these
cannot be represented by the i* modeling notations. Actors are entities that have
security goals. Security goals are those that prevent or detect threats, or recover the
system from threats. Actors are interested in Assets, can own, or delegate permis-
sion of usage of Assets to other actors. Threats targets Assets and occur through
vulnerabilities. Threats can also be unintentional, or result from accident, human
error, or natural disasters. Secure i* uses malicious representations equivalent of
the original i* motions to model this additional aspects. Also, Secure i* includes a
trade-off analysis method that makes use of the Secure i* notation in order to enable
software engineers find trade-offs to mitigate threats or attacks [22].
3.3 Problem-based and model-based modeling techniques
Problem-based modeling techniques that bring informal and formal aspects of software
development together in a single theoretical framework for software engineering design.
The approaches conceive development as the representation and step-wise transforma-
tion of software problem [54]. Problem-based modeling allows modeling and analysis of
different threat using formal and informal means to identify vulnerabilities and possible
mitigations to threats [54].
Model-based modeling techniques are based on the use of models that would help require-
ments analysts to understand complex software problem, and identify potential solutions
through abstraction[53]. The modeling notations are based on the UML or variants, or
extensions of it.
The problem-based modeling approaches cover the Misuse Cases (MUC), Abuse Cases,
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Misuse Case Map (MUCM) and Misuse Sequence Diagram (MUSD). The model-based
modeling approaches cover the techniques: Misuse Cases, Abuse Cases, Security Use
Case, Misuse Case Map and Misuse Sequence Diagram. Besides Security Use Case, other
modeling approaches can be treated as both problem-based and model-based.
3.4 Use Case-based Modeling Techniques
The Use Case-based modeling approaches were typically defining interactions between a
role (known in UML as an "actor") and a system, to achieve a goal[10]. The Use Case-
based approach covers only functional goals of a system, with one or more actor directly
involved in the software’s operation. The actor can be a human or an external system. The
notation of the Use Case is originally based on Ivar Jacobson’s Objectory notation[37].
The Use Case model is also not a kind of standalone model, it can be used in conjunction
with other models[58], such as i* models. The Use Case modeling approaches cover the
Misuse Cases, Abuse Cases, Security Use Case, Misuse Case Map and Misuse Sequence
Diagram. In order to parallel with i* -based modeling techniques in this empirical study,
and considering the most frequency mentioned technique in recent academic research,
Misuse Case was chosen as the candidate in the master thesis. Well, other modeling tech-
niques were also presented since there are some similarities between them.
3.4.1 Misuse Cases Modeling Approach
Misuse Cases (MUC) [59] are used to capture the various ways that a user with malicious
intentions can be a threat to a system. MUC extends regular Use Case diagram with new
concepts such as Misusers[35], Misuse Cases[35] and Mitigation Use Cases[35][38] in or-
der to elicit the security requirements of a system. It also incorporates two new relations,
threat and mitigate, in addition to usual relations such as extend, generalize, and associa-
tion of the Use Case diagram. Misuse Case diagrams use an opposite method of the Use
Case notation to represent malicious intentions of a user towards a system. The MUC can
be defined as Misuse Case and Misuser.
Misuse Case [59] A sequence of actions, including variants, that a system or other en-
tity can perform, interacting with Misusers of the entity and causing harm to some
stakeholder if the sequence is allowed to complete.
Misuser [59] An actor that initiates Misuse Case, either intentionally or inadvertently.
Compared to regular Use Cases, the inverted notation (figure 3.3) indicates both: similarity
(because the same symbol shapes are used) and negation (because of the inverted graph-
ics). Use Case and Misuse Case can, therefore, be shown in the same diagram without
confusion.
Ordinary Use Case relationships such as include, extend, and generalize can be used be-
tween Misuse Case too, and ordinary association relationships can be used between Mis-
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Figure 3.3: The notation of MUC
user and their Misuse Case. Misuse Case also can threaten a Use Case when the Use Case
is threatened by the Misuse Case.
Here is an example of inverted graphics (figure 3.4) shows that Misuse Case together with
regular Use Case in a high-level specification of part of Health Insurance System ( see
chapter 5). The figure 3.4 illustrates that attacker can attack the DHI department to modify
older persons’ personal health insurance data in the database. He also can illegally get the
password and user name from the mobile device that used for collecting health data of the
older person. After the attacker attacks the bank system, he also can make fake bills and
illegally get account number and password from insurance company.
3.4.2 Advantages of Misuse Case
Representation perspective and level of abstraction Misuse Cases is a kind of model-
based or problem-based modeling approach [43]. It is able to represent the scenarios
that depict both low and high-level security concerns by using a combination of for-
mal and informal techniques. Hence, MUC is more relevant for evaluating low-level
security concerns when it compared with ST. And since Use Case-based modeling
techniques are model-based modeling approaches in that they leverage significantly
the UML notations framework making Misuse Case is easier to learn, use and inte-
grate with conventional system design process.
Kind of security requirement engineering (SRE) tasks/activities The MUC approach
adequately cater to 4 tasks/activities such as “elicitation and analysis (EAS)”, “spec-
ification of SRs (S)”, “identification and modeling of assets (IMA)” and “identifi-
cation of vulnerabilities and threats (VT)” [43]. Hence, MUC will be relatively
more useful for systems where mitigation of threats and defense against attacks are
primary objectives.
Technical criteria and specification criteria Comparing with ST, MUC just has two sig-
nificant benefits in this classification. For instance, MUC has good “internal verifica-
tion support” in the technical criteria and specification criteria dimension, and when
it compared with ST, MUC can partially support external verification - “correct"[27].
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Figure 3.4: The example of MUC
Modeling language, process and method The same with ST, MUC offer very good sup-
port for aspects such as ability to formulate basic security requirements, and rep-
resentation of usage scenario. There is also substantial tool support for MUC and
also have evidence in the literature that suggests increasing interest and adoption of
the MUC in industry[13]. MUC offer support for “reuse of provided artifacts” in
later stages, especially in the “testing” stage of a system development[59]. It means
MUC will be more relevant for test-driven development (TDD) of secure systems.
Relevant SRE notation and software evolution and other perspectives MUC embrace
the notion of risk and mitigation[27] that guarantees MUC can be more suitable to
use when issues of immunity against attacks or attack mitigations are paramount in-
terest. MUC also have generally better support for “impact analysis” and “modularity"[43].
3.4.3 Disadvantages of Misuse Case
Representation perspective and level of abstraction Misuse Case is not goal-based mod-
eling approach[43]. Hence, Misuse Case cannot support analyzer to model and an-
alyze the system from the aspect of systems’ security goals which can be insist of
security constrains. Misuse Case is also not process-based. Thus, analyzing security
requirements is also cannot fulfill when using MUC via process modeling to analyze
secure concerns.
Kind of security requirement engineering (SRE) tasks/activities Compare to Secure Tro-
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pos, Misuse Case can partially fulfill with classification of “verification and valida-
tion support” - only one dimension of “internal verification support” regarding to the
classification of the kind of security requirement engineering (SRE) tasks/activities.
And it is also only can identify threats but no mitigations can suggest according to
the analysis the sub-dimension of “identification and modeling of assets” [43].
Technical criteria and specification criteria As well as Secure Tropos, Misuse Case is
also cannot fully support for the dimension of Technical criteria and Specification
criteria, such as Misuse Case is just partially support for “external verification”, and
no support for “standards integration” [27].
Modeling language, process and method Misuse Case is just partially support for re-
quirements reuse except one of its character - “appropriate”, and cannot fully sup-
port for the completeness of other development stages. In contrast with Secure
Tropos that is able to “represent security mechanisms” and “low-level security re-
quirements” in a system, Misuse Case has no ability to do either. Misuse Case
also cannot provides “reuse of provided artifacts” in later phase since the reusable
artifacts for the MUC is just only used on stage of “testing” [43][59].
Relevant SRE notation and software evolution and other perspectives Meanwhile, as
cited in “software evolution support” for Secure Tropos, Misuse Case is not the best
benefit of this dimension as well. Even though some of characteristics are higher
support to do evolution, such as medium support for “modularity” and “change
impact analysis”, Misuse Cases are still cannot support for “change propagation”.
Hence, there is no chance to track the change of the system, and cannot promise that
change is “correctly propagated”, for example there still left several inconsistent
dependencies in the MUC diagrams.
3.4.4 Other Use Case-based modeling Techniques
1. Abuse Case is used to show the complete interaction between a system and one or
more actors, where the results of the interaction are harmful to either the system,
one of the actors, or one of the stakeholders in the system[47]. Abuse case also
presents abuse of patronage used to complete the use case. Abuse case uses the same
notations as use case diagrams, it enables the creation of abuse case specifications in
standard notation such as UML[33]. The difference between Abuse Case and MUC
are that Misuse Cases use an inverted form of the UC notation but Abuse Case use
the standard notion to show the interaction between a system and actors.
2. Security Use Cases [31] are used to specify how a system is able to successfully
protect itself from relevant security threats. It allows the analysis and specification
security requirements. Unlike Misuse Cases [59] focus on detecting successful
attack against a system and analysis security threats, Security Use Case shows a
system’s capability to handle security threats. Security Use Case is used by the
requirement team, other than security experts. The composition of a Security Use
Cases depends on the type of security requirements a system is supposed to fulfill
[31].
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3. Misuse Case Map combines notions from Misuse Case and Use Case Maps to cap-
ture the security requirements of a system from an architectural viewpoint. Misuse
Case Maps can be used to envision the effect of an intrusion on the architecture of
the system. It extends the notation of the Use Case Maps notation with vulnerabil-
ities, exploit paths and mitigation. MUCM has potential to significantly improve
the understanding of intrusions and identification of mitigations when compared to
MUC combined with a system architecture outline[41].
4. Misuse Sequence Diagram is a sequence diagram in a UML is a kind of interaction
diagram[42]. The sequence diagram is used to show the process operation and oper-
ation orders. Misuse Sequence Diagram[42] is a threat modeling approach designed
to show the sequence of attacks from an intruder to a system. MUSD is based on the
UML and MUC diagrams and utilizes security concepts like vulnerability exploita-
tion and mitigation. The notation of MUSD is very like the MUC notation. The
benefit of MUSD is that the MUSD can show the sequence of steps of the intrusion.
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Chapter 4
Experiment Management
This chapter defines the overall approach for experiment’s management. The management
highlights roles, schedule, risks and how to handle the experiment results.
4.1 Experiment Organizers
The experiment organizers were the co-supervisors, Peter Karpati and Olawande Daramola,
they assisted the participants, organized them and helped to answer any question during
the experiment. They also record time spent, problem raised by participants.
4.2 Participants
The experiment subjective consists of undergraduate students group - XCom’13 at IDI,
who was always collecting money for excursion. The reason why they were chosen as the
subjective of the experiment because we can pay some money to support their excursion.
Hence, the payment may motivates the participants to seriously take part in the experiment.
If not,in future nobody dares to ask them to participant in any experiment or research any-
more due to their bad attitudes of the experiment. There are several research experiments
in a year, thus their attitudes were also an emphasis issue for other researchers to refer-
ence. The participants were currently at their second year studies at NTNU, and they had
the background of ICT as preferred. Through the pre-questionnaire of the experiment, the
participants were asked to report their general background such as the man-month work
and the lengths of their finished semester studies at the IDI department. Most partici-
pants reported three semesters of ICT studies that means they had been taught Use Cases
modeling techniques or at least UML activate sequence modeling in their software engi-
neering course as one of the compulsory courses for undergraduate students at IDI. They
also reported 0-2 man-month work off the campus studies. For instance, the internship or
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summer job in an enterprise. Thus, they have ability to use one of the mentioned modeling
approaches in the pre-experiment sheets (see appendix A). In the line with their relevant
student projects and exercises on campus studies, also with their ability to understand the
basic of this experiment content according to their experience on relevant enterprise intern-
ship, the participants can be believed have ability to finish the experiment. However, the
experience on any enterprise work was not a mandatory criterion for seeking participants
since the participants were students at the university, they were not the expert. Therefore,
the background of the man-month work was a threat to validity like other threats in this
experiment. It was worthy to discuss the threats to validity of the experiment to ensure the
possibility of replicating the investigation of the experiment for reuse later. It was also had
value to discuss the possibility of replicating both the design and the results. Hence, the
inevitable threats to the validity of why the experiment had been decided to use these stu-
dents as the experiment sample and why not other participants were discussed in chapter
12.
4.3 Experiment Time Schedule
The experiment was performed at 14:15 PM at March 13th, 2012 in auditorium F1 at
the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Since there were 50 participants,
hence the room F1 was big enough for the experiment. The experiment was expected
110 minutes to run, but the participants were too smart to finish the experiment before the
planned time. Time threats that may impact on the results of the experiment were also
discussed in chapter 12.
4.4 Experiment Risks
There were definitely some risks that threaten the validity of the experiment which cannot
be avoided. All the identified risks were analyzed and evaluated such as student back-
ground, experience on the modeling approaches and other relevant issues and so forth.
Although the experiment was expected to valid for the research goal, there was still a pos-
sible that the experiment might be not in very appropriately method since this experiment
was the first time to perform an empirical study of the two modeling approaches in the
requirements engineering research field. Hence, it was very valuable to discuss the exper-
iment reliability and these kinds of problems were also the threats to the validity of the
experiment (see Chapter 12). All problems that cannot be avoided were reduced as less
as possible according to the knowledge and experience of the author with the purpose to
improve the experiment practicality and for the future replication.
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4.5 Experiment Measurement
The measurements can be divided into four parts. Not only participants’ background was
compared but also the quantity of threats and mitigation they suggested were also ana-
lyzed as well. The experiment was designed to get the participants’ feedback based on the
participants’ performance and preference on the modeling techniques. The performance
can be analyzed through the number of identified threats and mitigations where the partic-
ipants have read and applied from the relevant cases with modeling techniques. And their
self-assessed the usage of diagrams, textual description and memory were counted in per-
centage with the purpose to evaluate the preference of the participants on the two different
modeling techniques. It also can further analyze their preference through their feedback
from the post-questionnaire (TAM format[20]). The data reported by the participants by
their self-assessment can help to analyze their perception of the two modeling approaches.
Hence, the measurements that used in this experiment could be more precisely in quantity
standard other than just asking them whether they will use which modeling technique in
the future like in the post questionnaire (see Appendix A). The quality data can also help
to analyze the experiment from the statistics view and can enhance the results more de-
pendable. The further experiment sheets design details was discussed in chapter 6 with the
experiment variables and hypotheses. Other experiment results such as time used, prob-
lems that occurred during the experiment were also recorded by experiment organizer and
analyzed further in chapter 12.
4.6 Experiment Measurement Priorities
The experiment measurement priorities in the experiment can be expressed as three main
higher priorities. The primary objectives of procedure were: 1) the numbers of threats and
mitigations that the participants have identified and suggested, and 2) their estimated the
usage percentage of textual description and diagram, 3) their perception of the two mod-
eling techniques. The reason why these three measurements were higher priorities since
through a multi-dimensional view of the experiment, the excepted results can be more
credible for the research. And because the main concerns of the experiment was two core
problems - the participants’ performance and their preference, thus the three measurements
can fully fulfilled with evaluation criteria. Therefore, these three measurements have been
decided as the high priorities in the experiment results analysis. The general categories
of threats and mitigations according to the participants’ responses were also cannot be ig-
nored in the experiment. However, the qualities of threats and mitigations were considered
as low priorities because each evaluator has his/her own rule and criteria for the qualities.
Therefore, the qualities of the threats and mitigations and its sub-categories of threats and
mitigation were difficult to evaluate, so the main core points of the research were not focus
on the qualities in this time. Last but not the least, time spend and problems occurred dur-
ing the experiment were considered as low priorities, how they impacted on the experiment
results were also discussed in the chapter 12.
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Chapter 5
Description of System Design
To test the procedure in an experiment, two systems were designed and paired with two
modeling approaches. After each case description, a possible system threats description
was presented in order to help the readers to understand the system quickly.
5.1 The Background of Cases
The background of the first case - Health Insurance System came from the author’s cus-
tomer driven project course in the autumn 2010. The first case extends the SINTEF student
“ESMUS” project[69], combining Norwegian health insruance welfare with a home health
monitoring system, that developed with the purpose of remotely monitoring the US Mil-
itary veterans. The second case was using the background of eBay, Amazon and Tmall
online shopping. Nowadays, the buyer browses the goods online, when he/she decides to
send the order; he/she has to provide credit card information in the parallel with sending
the order to the transaction system. In this case both buyers and salespersons were ranked
by credit rating and the case add a new method to the current transaction e-commerce - the
“trust”, buyers can refer to the credit rating of the salespersons to decide whether to buy
the goods or not.
5.2 System in Details
5.2.1 Health Insurance System
An application that runs on the Microsoft and Android Mobile platform could be used
to collect an older person’s health data everyday which includes heart beat rates, carbon
dioxide in blood, body temperature, and blood pressure.
25
All of the data from an older person could be sent at once or one at a time to the Health In-
surance Department (HID) server in the hospital. The most important and delicate matters
for the health insurance department is the privacy of all older person’s medical information
and the sharing of it. When HID receives the data, a doctor analyses the data and gives a
feedback, the feedback is sent to the older person by a system, and also a copy is sent to
HID.
When HID receives the feedback form from the doctor, they will calculate fees and update
the health insurance database in the hospital, then check the database of the status of
older person’s health insurance, to figure out whether the medical health fee is now above
1800NOK or not. According to the welfare and security system in Norway, if the medical
health fee is above 1800NOK the older person will not need to pay the bills in a normal
year rather, HID will request bank to send the bills to the insurance company, otherwise,
HID will request bank to send bills to the older person that should be paid in a normal
year.
When bank receives the message from the HID, they will create bills according to the
messages received from HID, and send bills to the older person or insurance company. We
are only concerned with the way the older person and insurance company pay the bills via
Internet. Bank should guarantee that there is a secure interaction between the users and
bank system.
5.2.2 Threats for Health Insurance System
The Health Insurance System extends the ESMUS project with a combination of Norwe-
gian healthcare welfare case. The design of the system was considered the dataflow in the
system. For instance, the application used on the smart mobile phone with anti-virus soft-
ware, the attacker attacks that phone and eavesdrop on the dataflow between the phone and
the system in the hospital. The attacker can also eavesdrop the dataflow within the system
and the dataflow between the hospital and insurance companies. Hence, the threats exist
vary in the system communication. Figure 5.1 presents an overview of the HIS system and
the relationship between each agent of the HIS system.
5.2.3 Secure Tropos diagram for Health Insurance System
Figure 5.2 illustrates the Secure Tropos diagrams for Health Insurance System. The no-
tation used in the diagram was presented in Chapter 3. Four security constraints were
considered in this case: 1) When older person send his/her health data via the applica-
tion on mobile, he/she has to verify the user name and password of the application on the
platform. 2) When older person pays the payment to bank system, there are 3 security
constraints to ensure security concerns between the interaction between the older person
and bank system - Personal account number, personal number and the password of the
account. 3) When insurance companies pay the payments to bank system, they also need
to verify their account number, company’s ID and the password. 4) Bank should double
check the request messages from HID before the bills are created.
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Figure 5.1: Relationship between different agents of the Health Insurance System
Figure 5.2: Overview of Health Insurance System
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Figure 5.3: Attacker illegally get the password and send data to DHI
Figure 5.4: Attacker modifies the database after he/she attacked the system
5.2.4 Misuse Case diagrams for Health Insurance System
Figure 5.3 and 5.4 are the examples of Health Insurance System’s threats. Attacker can get
the password and send the data package to DHI server without notice by older persons in
figure 5.3. Figure 5.5 presents attacker gets the password of the insurance company, then
he can transfer money to his own account.
Figure 5.6 shows the attacker gets the password of the bank system and login illegally. He
can create fake bills and collect the payments through his own account.
5.2.5 Net Shopping
The most known traditional way is that we browse goods, compare the goods provided by
different salespersons, and decide to buy it, pay for it and wait for its delivery. Another
way to buy stuff via the Internet is “trust rating”. In trust rating, we pay the fees to pay-
pal first, when we receive the goods, we check and use it within 3 days to ensure we
are comfortable with the goods then we can confirm the deal with pay-pal to finish this
transaction, pay-pal pays money to the seller after we confirm the deal.
“Trust rating” is a transaction for the salesperson. Each successful transaction allows buy-
ers to mark a credit evaluation for it. Evaluation is divided into positive, neutral, and
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Figure 5.5: Attacker gets the password of the insurance company system
Figure 5.6: Attacker gets the password of bank system and create fake bills, collect pay-
ments by his own account.
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negative feedback categories. Each credit is equal to a credit score. After each transac-
tion, if there is a good evaluation for the salesperson, they will get one point. No point
for medium evaluation, one point is deducted from a salesperson for a negative evaluation.
If a salesperson has no medium and negative evaluations within 300 continuous transac-
tions, he will get a diamond to illustrate the high trust rating. The more diamonds he has,
the higher the good quality and trust during the transaction. In this case there are three
important vulnerabilities:
1. How to avoid salespersons selling goods to themselves in order to earn more dia-
monds.
2. The salespersons could sell the virtual products (e.g. illegal scanned eBook) in a
very low price to their partners (themselves or other salespersons), after they get the
diamonds, they may sell other real products (e.g. print copy of a real book).
3. Some third party platforms may help salespersons to get diamonds in a dubious way,
such that all the sold goods are later refunded to the seller but they will get a fee after
the transaction (when the salesperson has already earned the diamond).
5.2.6 Threats for Net Shopping System
The Net shopping case refers to nowadays online transaction. An assumption was made for
the system that there is a possible way that buyers buy goods after checking salespersons’
credit ranking. In the case, “Trust” is used as a bridge, the buyers can try to use the goods
with few days before he/she decides to whether buy it or not. The rule of credit ranking
is based on the successful transactions. If there is no medium evaluation from buyers, the
salespersons can earn 1 score. And if salespersons get 300 continues positive evaluation,
they will get diamonds to show they are in the best trust rating. Hence, if we want to
update nowadays transaction systems, there are several threats shall be avoided. For ex-
ample, salespersons sale goods to themselves and evaluate transaction by themselves shall
be avoided. We also have to make sure the dataflow is safe if a hacker is eavesdropping
on the system. The third party companies are also forbidden to help salespersons to earn
the diamond via fake transactions. For instance, salesperson sales goods to these compa-
nies, after these salespersons pay money to these companies, these companies will give
a positive evaluation to salespersons and return the goods to salespersons too. Finally if
buyers just want to try to use the goods but never want to pay for it on purpose, the avoid-
ing method for this situation should also be realized in real life. Figure 5.7 illustrates the
relationship between the agencies of the Net Shopping system.
5.2.7 Secure Tropos diagram for Net Shopping
Figure 5.8 illustrates Secure Tropos diagrams for Net Shopping. In the diagram, 1) there
are two security constraints when the buyers confirm a transaction, the buyers’ account
number and its password. 2) When buyers decide to buy goods, the order will send to
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Figure 5.7: Relationship between different agencies in the Net shopping system
system trader monitors first in order to double check that whether the buyers and salesper-
son is the same person. 3) The information of goods on the website shall be published by
system trader monitors and they have to check whether the goods price and whether the
goods is a virtual product.
5.2.8 Misuse Case diagrams for Net shopping case
Figure 5.9 shows salesperson pretends as a buyer and sales goods to himself or herself.
Figure 5.10 shows some third parties pretend as a buyer to buy goods to help salesperson
to get more diamonds. Figure 5.11 shows how attacker can pretend as a system trade
monitor to allow the virtual products transaction.
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Figure 5.8: Secure Tropos diagrams for Net Shopping
Figure 5.9: Salesperson pretends as a buyer
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Figure 5.10: Third parties pretends as a buyer
Figure 5.11: Attacker allows the virtual products trade
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Chapter 6
Experiment - The Variables and
Hypotheses of the Experiment
In order to get a basis for evaluation the performance and preference of the ST and MUC
approaches, this experiment was performed. The experiment involved computer science
undergraduate students in their second years study, and they already had relevant experi-
ence on the system modeling studies or some of them had internship experience in enter-
prise.
6.1 Experiment Objective Definition
As mentioned above in the problem description, the main objective of the experiment
was to identify whether there were significant differences between the two modeling ap-
proaches when the participants were trying to apply approaches to two cases. The experi-
ment was motivated that it was the first time to compare the two modeling techniques - ST
and MUC in an empirical study, thus it was need to understand the difference in individ-
ual performance and preference of participants when they were using the two approaches
regarding to their background. The method used in the experiment to determining the ob-
jective of the research was a Latin-Square experimental design to control the techniques
and cases order. All the participants’ responses were recorded on the sheets of experiment.
• Object of Study The object of the experiment study were the sophomore students
at the Department of Computer and Information Science, Norwegian University of
Science and Technology(NTNU). Before the experiment, It was already known that
they have learned the UML use case modeling more or less in their software engi-
neering course and they may also used this technique for their exercises during their
recent two years study.
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• Purpose The purpose of the experiment was to evaluate the participants’ perfor-
mance and preference based on the background of their two years study and proba-
bly their summer internships.
• Perspective The perspective was from the point of view of the author, the author’s
supervisor and co-supervisors from the “ReqSec” project team. The interesting
thing concerns that if there was any systematic significant difference in the per-
formance and preference between the two modeling approaches. And there were
also people who might be interesting in the experiment results.
• Quality Focus The main effect in the experiment was the individual learning of
UML Use case and other relevant modeling techniques study. Since the design of
experiment was not plan to introduce ST and MUC modeling approaches to the par-
ticipants in advance. Hence, both modeling techniques had the same complexity for
the participants but may not involve the cases; the case validity was also discussed
in the results and chapter 12.
• Context The experiment was run as an offline format - paper format. The context of
the controlled experiment was constructed based on the author’s project during the
master study and current e-commerce transaction.
6.2 Planning
6.2.1 Context Selection
As described in chapter 5, the contexts were selected from the author’s project and current
online transaction in the world. Since the experiment was planned to perform at the uni-
versity, so it was run off-line. The cases addressed the real problems in recent research of
IT technology.
The use of the two modeling approaches with two cases as the experiment context provide
not only the author and his supervisors but also other researchers a brand new view of
the two modeling techniques according to the experiment results. The experiment sheets
were designed with the answer sheets together, thus no extra forms were need for the
experiment data collection and so forth. Furthermore, the experiment context also provides
a good opportunity for replicating such as find threats and mitigations, estimate the usage
of diagrams and textual description section in the two parts of experiment. Also, the
participants have studied relevant modeling technique - UML. Hence, there was no need to
spend too much time and effort to teach them the knowledge about that modeling method,
so creating the background environment for the experiment to run was not an essential
thing since all the participants were come from the same department with very similar
background.
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6.2.2 Variables and Its Connection with the Measurement
There were 12 variables were chosen by strictly following the criteria of independent vari-
ables and dependent variables (Claes Wohin 2000)[17]. In table 6.1, there were the vari-
ables and their explanation used for the experiment. The variables can be classified as
four main areas - the background, performance, estimating the usage of two modeling
approaches and the perception of the two modeling approaches.
1. Several general variables were used to evaluate the participants’ background, there
were KNOW_UC, KONW_MUC, KNOW_IST, KNOW_ST, KNOW_Mal-activity,
KNOW_UML-activity, KNOW_MOD, STUDY and JOB.
2. THR, MIT and THMI were used for evaluating the participants’ performance during
the experiment.
3. The variables of THR_TXT,THR_DIAG, THR_MEM were used for asking the par-
ticipants’ how they separated their work in each part of the experiment by using
threats to finish the tasks. On the contrary, MIT_TXT, MIT_DIAG, MIT_THR and
MIT_MEM were used for asking the participants to estimate the percentage of us-
age in each part of the experiment in condition of they just use mitigations to finish
the tasks. The number they estimated here for the two part - THR and MIT were
counting into 100% for each part.
4. There were 12 questions in the post-questionnaire, which were used for asking par-
ticipants report their perception of the modeling techniques after they use the mod-
eling technique to finish the tasks. The 12 statements were marking from PER_1
to PER_12 and these 12 questions can be classified into 3 categories - PER_PU,
PER_PEOU, and PER_ITU. The 3 categories were used for evaluating the partici-
pants’ perception of the two modeling approaches. For instance, whether it was easy
to use the modeling technique, or whether they will use the modeling technique in
future.
Points 2 to 4 were the main focus of the empirical study as mentioned above, hence the
hypotheses were also based on these concerns as planned. (see 6.2.3)
Table 6.1: Variables of the Experiment
Name Explanation
TECH = MUC, TECH = ST The technique used in that part of the experi-
ment, either MUC(Misuse Case) or ST (Secure
Tropos).
CASE = HIS, CASE=NS The case used in that part of the experiment, ei-
ther HIS (Health Insurance System) or NS (Net
Shopping).
Continued on next page
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Table 6.1 – continued from previous page
Name Explanation
KNOW_UC, KNOW_MUC The participants’ self-assessed knowledge
about use cases (KNOW_UC), misuse cases
(KNOW_MUC) on a 5-point scale, where 1 is
“Never heard of it” and 5 is “Expert”.
KNOW_IST, KNOW_ST The participants’ self-assessed knowledge
about i* (KNOW_IST), and Secure Tropos
(KNOW_ST) on a 5-point scale, where 1 is
“Never heard of it” and 5 is “Expert”.
KNOW_Mal-activity, KNOW_UML_Activity The participants’ self-assessed knowl-
edge about Mal-activity (KNOW_Mal-
activity), UML activity diagram
(KNOW_UML_Activity) on a 5-point scale,
where 1 is “Never heard of it” and 5 is “Expert”.
KNOW_MOD The participants’ self-assessed knowledge
about system modeling (KNOW_MOD) on a
5-point scale, where 1 is “Never heard of it”
and 5 is “Expert”.
STUDY The participants’ self-reported semesters of
ICT-studies.
JOB The participants’ self-reported man-month of
ICT-relevant work experience.
THR, MIT The number of unique threats (THR) and miti-
gation (MIT) identified by the participants.
THMI The sum of unique threats and mitigation
(THMI) identified by the participants.
THR_TXT, THR_DIAG, THR_MEM The estimated extent of the use of the
textual description (THR_TXT), diagram(s)
(THR_DIAG) and the exclusive use of memory
(THR_MEM) to identify threats in percentage
(should sum up to 100).
MIT_TXT, MIT_DIAG, MIT_THR, MIT_MEM The estimated extent of the use of the
textual description (MIT_TXT), diagram(s)
(MIT_DIAG), the exclusive use of the previ-
ously identified threats (MIT_THR) and the ex-
clusive use of memory (MIT_MEM) to identi-
fied mitigation in percentage (should sum up to
100).
PER_1, PER_2,...PER_12 Scores on the 5-point Likert scales for the
four statements about perceived usefulness
(PER_PU), perceived ease of use (PER_PEOU)
and intention to use (PER_ITU) of the tech-
niques.
Continued on next page
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Table 6.1 – continued from previous page
Name Explanation
PER_PU, PER_PEOU, PER_ITU Average scores on the 5-point Likert scales for
the four statements about perceived usefulness
(PER_PU), perceived ease of use (PER_PEOU)
and intention to use (PER_ITU) of the tech-
niques.
PER_AVE Average scores on the 5-point Likert scales for
all the twelve statement about the techniques.
6.2.3 Hypotheses Formulation
The hypotheses for the experiment were listed in table 6.2. There were 9 hypotheses of
the experiment; all of them were covered with the variables that were mentioned in the
table6.1.
Table 6.2: Hypotheses of the Experiment
ID Description Representation
H10 There will be the same number of identified threats be-
tween the each two groups.
THR[ST] = THR[MUC]
H11 There will be a significant difference in the number of
identified threats between each two groups.
THR[MUC] 6= THR[ST]
H20 There will be the same number of identified mitigations
between the two groups.
MIT[ST] = MIT[MUC]
H21 There will be a significant difference in the number of
identified mitigations between the two groups.
MIT[MUC] 6= MIT[ST]
H30 There will be the same number of identified threats and
mitigations between the two groups.
THMI[ST] = THMI[MUC]
H31 There will be a significant difference in the number
of identified threats and mitigations between the two
groups.
THMI[MUC] 6= THMI[ST]
H40 There will be the same in the estimated use of the dia-
grams of the two techniques in identifying threats.
THR_DIAG[ST] = THR_DIAG[MUC]
H41 There will be a significant difference in the estimated
use of the diagrams of the two techniques in identifying
threats.
THR_DIAG[MUC] 6= THR_DIAG[ST]
H50 There will be the same in the estimated use of the dia-
grams of the two techniques in identifying mitigations.
MIT_DIAG[ST] = MIT_DIAG[MUC]
H51 There will be a significant difference in the estimated
use of the diagrams of the two techniques in identifying
mitigations.
MIT_DIAG[MUC] 6= MIT_DIAG[ST]
Continued on next page
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Table 6.2 – continued from previous page
ID Description Representation
H60 The two techniques will be perceived very similarly re-
garding usefulness.
PER_PU[ST] = PER_PU[MU]
H61 The two techniques will be perceived significantly dif-
ferently regarding usefulness.
PER_PU[MUC] 6= PER_PU[ST]
H70 The two techniques will be perceived very similarly re-
garding ease of use.
PER_PEOU[ST] = PER_PEOU[MUC]
H71 The two techniques will be perceived significantly dif-
ferently regarding ease of use.
PER_PEOU[MUC] 6= PER_PEOU[ST]
H80 The two techniques will be intended to be used signifi-
cantly similarly.
PER_ITU[ST]= PER_ITU[MUC]
H81 The two techniques will be intended to be used signifi-
cantly differently.
PER_ITU[MUC] 6= PER_ITU[ST]
H90 The two techniques will be perceived significantly sim-
ilarly
PER_AVE[ST] = PER_AVE[MUC]
H91 The two techniques will be perceived significantly dif-
ferently.
PER_AVE[MUC] 6= PER_AVE[ST]
6.2.4 Experiment Design
All the problems concerned have been stated above already, and the independent and de-
pendent variables also have been chosen. Hence, the following steps were determining the
measurement scales for the variables. In order to reduce the learning effect, the experiment
sheets were designed by following the rules of Latin Square experimental design[4]. The
experiment involved student participants recruited from the sophomore students in March
2012. The students belonged to an organization that received some payment for each par-
ticipant in the experiment. The research questions were stated in previous chapters, the
payment in this experiment was the inducement in order to ensure that the participants
took in the experiment seriously.
The participants have used two techniques individually on two different cases: Health
Insurance System (HIS) and Net Shopping (NS). To control the techniques and cases order
in the experiment, a Latin-Squares experimental design[4] was used as shown in the table
6.3. The within-experiment data regarding performance, estimated use of diagrams and
perception thereby become paired, comparing two dependent samples.
Table 6.3: Latin-Squares experimental design
Case order: Technique order: HIS before NS NS before HIS
MUC before ST Group 4 Group 3
ST before MUC Group 2 Group 1
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6.2.5 Data Collection
After controlling for the participants’ background, for each combination of technique and
case in the experiment sheets, three types of tasks were designed for collecting data in both
parts of the experiment. There were a performance task, an estimation task (estimating the
usage of the textual description, diagrams and their memory for the performance task in
percentage) and a perception task (Post-questionnaire). All the variables were summarized
in table 6.1. The primary distinction in the experiment was based on the technique used
(variable TECH). All the other measurement variables were categorized and compared
with each other depending on whether they related to one or the other technique. For
example, the number of mitigations identified (MIT) when ST was used, was expressed as
THR [ST]. The measurement variables were explained in section 6.2.1 and summarized
here in the following paragraphs.
• Background was measured by a pre-task questionnaire addressing the participants’
self-assessed knowledge of several modeling approaches (see table 6.1) on a 5-
points scale [5], where 1 is “Never heard of it” and 5 is “Expert”. They were also
asked to report their numbers of completed semesters of ICT studies and man-month
of ICT-relevant work experience.
• Performance was measured by asking the participants to identify and list as many
as threats or mitigations as they can for two specific systems. The answers were
coded qualitatively in order to determine exactly how many threats and mitigations
each participant have identified according their responses. It was also planned to
categorize the type of the threats and mitigations but due to the criticality of eval-
uation by different person make it was a difficult task to control. Thus, this work
will left for future experiment where boilerplate[1][60] - a standard templates of the
security threats and mitigations identification will be considered to help to solve this
problem in future experiment. However, a general classification for the threat types
were introduced in the experiment as a pioneer work for the future experiment.
• The estimating of use of text, diagrams and memory were used for solving the
performance task when the participants spent their attention on estimating the per-
centage of use textual description, diagrams and memory in different tasks and mod-
eling techniques. The percentage was counted into 100%.
• Perception was measured by a post-task questionnaire adapted from the Technology
Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis 1989)[20]. There were 4 questions addressed
perceived usefulness (PU), 4 questions addressed perceived ease of use (PEOU) and
4 investigated the participants’ intention to use (ITU) the technique in the future,
each rated on a 5-point Likert scale. There were 3 negative questions, with a lower
score reflection a positive opinion that were inverted before data analysis(see section
8.2.4) .
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Chapter 7
Experiment - Execution
7.1 Preparation
The participants were informed that the experiment was planned to study the outcome for
the “ReqSec” project, and their background match the research expectation. The partici-
pants were interesting in the experiment since they need money for their excursion. The
experiment budget allows us to offer them a fee to support their excursion, they granted
that they took part in the experiment seriously at least they tried their best to do the exper-
iment, since a good attitude was very important for the experiment.
7.2 Execution
The experiment was executed within the expected minutes. Due to the cases and tech-
niques order, the participants used different the experiment sheets and filled in their re-
sponses in the experiment sheets. Each group had to try to use the two modelling ap-
proaches with the cases and filled in the questionnaire forms after they read the modelling
technique with case in each part of experiment. The detailed experiment procedure com-
prised the following steps:
1. Filling in the pre-experiment questionnaire.
2. Reading a short introduction to the experiment.
3. Using the first assigned technique on the first assigned case:
(a) Reading the introduction to the first technique.
(b) Reading the textual description of the first case.
(c) Identifying as many threats and mitigation as possible.
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(d) Estimating the usage percentages.
(e) Filling in the post-experiment questionnaire (TAM).
4. Short break.
5. Repeat steps 3a-3e for the second technique and case.
The duration of the steps was decided dynamically, there was always enough time to finish
the steps.
7.3 Data validation
The data were collected from 50 participants. After checked their responses sheets, there
was no evidence to remove any data from the participants’ responses that means all the
responses were valid. It was pleasant to see that they can took in the experiment seriously
and the data cannot be better since all the groups finished the experiment and filled in all
the tasks in the experiment sheets. Even though there was one student from the group 2
who did not response the task of estimating usage of diagram, textual and memory, it still
no need to remove data and could kept his/her data in the sample, since this situation might
be occurred when there was an occasionally issue during the experiment execution. Also,
it was not essential to contract this student to fill in it again since s/he already knew the
experiment text, there must exist a big learning effect to risk the experiment.
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Chapter 8
Experiment - Analysis and
interpretation
This chapter presents the data collection, how the data was analyzed and interpreted. How
the data reflects the research goals were also discussed in this chapter.
8.1 Statistics description
8.1.1 Data representation
As the first step of analyzing the data, several graphical statistics were presented to visu-
alize the data with the purpose of illustrating data distribution.
• Background According to the pre-experiment questionnaire responses, it was dis-
covered that the most participants had experience or have tried to use UML use
case and system modeling in their previous studies. But almost all the participants
were not familiar with other modeling approaches. It was not a surprise since they
were sophomore students and none of them were expert of any modeling technique.
Hence, they match well enough for the experiment sample expectation. The follow-
ing figures 8.1 to 8.6 show the detail information of the participants’ background.
In figure 8.1 and 8.2, the vertical axis value represents how many participants self-
report their knowledge of the modeling techniques in the experiment sheets. The
horizontal axis presents the knowledge level of relevant modeling techniques that
cover from “never heard about it” to “expert”. For example, it can be found that in
the figure 8.1 and 8.2 there was no one expert on all these modeling techniques.
Figure 8.3 represents the participants’ completed study at the university level. Ap-
parently, most of the participants had 3 semester studies in information technology.
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Figure 8.1: Pre-experiment questionnaire of Group 1 and Group 2
Figure 8.2: Pre-experiment questionnaire of Group 3 and Group 4
Figure 8.3: Completed study semesters
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Figure 8.4: Man-month jobs
However, there were still 5 persons from the group 1 report they had more than or
less than 3 semester studies, such as 1, 4, 5 and 7 semester studies. 2 persons from
the group 2 reported they had 2 semester studies and 1 person from the group 4
reported 9 semester studies at the university level. But for those participants who
have reported they had 5, 7 and 9 semesters study that can be divided into 2 parts
according to their self-report that they had 3 or 4 semester studies in IT, and few
semesters study in other study fields. Hence, they were still treated had around 3
semester studies at ICT courses.
Most of the participants reported that they had no work experience. One student
from group 3 did not report the man-month job, so it was marked N/A in the figure.
However, few participants had relevant internship or summer job work experience
on ICT technology (see figure 8.4).
• Finding Threats and Mitigation by Groups The following figure shows that the
total number of threats was identified by each group. Since each group have used
two different cases with two modeling techniques, the data was extracted from the
paired technique with case regarding to the group number (see figure 8.5 to 8.8).
The comparison of performance was discussed in section 8.2.
Figure 8.5 presents that group 1 and group 4 had the same experiment task in their
first part of experiment. The modeling technique was ST with Net shopping case.
The participants in group 1 found 36 threats and 40 mitigations when they have
applied ST modeling technique with NS case. Group 4 found 36 threats as well, but
they just suggested 31 mitigations in total when they have applied the same modeling
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Figure 8.5: Secure Tropos with Net Shopping (Group 1 and 4)
Figure 8.6: Secure Tropos with Health Insurance System (Group 2 and 3)
technique with group 1. Figure 8.6 expresses that group 2 and group 3 had the
same experiment task in their second part of experiment due to the Latin-Squares
experimental design (see table 6.3). The modeling technique was the same with
group 1 and group 4 but with a different case - Health Insurance System. 24 threats
and 24 mitigations were identified by the participants in the group 2. Meanwhile,
31 threats and 18 mitigations were identified by the participants in group 3.
For the second part of the experiment, group 1 and group 4 have used MUC mod-
eling technique with Health Insurance System. 45 threats and 42 mitigations were
identified by the participants from group 1, and 49 threats and 51 mitigations were
identified by the participant from group 4. Meanwhile, it was the first part exper-
iment for group 2 and group 3 who have used MUC modeling technique with Net
shopping case. 22 threats and 18 mitigations were identified by the participant from
group 2, and 29 threats and 36 mitigations were identified by the participant from
group 3. The histograms show the number of threats and mitigations that the par-
ticipants have identified in total. Each column is comprised of identified threats and
mitigation together.
• Estimating the usage of Textual Description, Diagrams and Memory The partic-
ipants’ self-reported the estimated usage of textual description, diagrams and mem-
ory for each modeling approach they used and these numbers were also counted
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Figure 8.7: Misuse Case with Health Insurance System (Group 1 and 4)
Figure 8.8: Misuse Case with Net Shopping (Group 2 and 3)
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Figure 8.9: Estimating the usage of Textual Description, Diagrams and Memory for Secure
Tropos with Net Shopping Case
in this experiment in order to analyze the participants’ perception as an evaluation
methods. All data according to their responses were coded as the following tables
in excel (see figure 8.9 - 8.12) for further analysis.
Figure 8.9 - 8.12 present that the participants’ self-assessed how they have sepa-
rated their work on each modeling technique they have applied in the experiment.
The figures 8.9-8.12 illustrate the participants’ responses in this experiment task.
Both modeling approaches were estimated the usage of threats or mitigation by the
participants in order to finish relevant tasks as mentioned in the experiment sheets
(see Appendix A).
• Post-experiment Questionnaire There were two post-experiment questionnaires
for the two parts of experiment. Both parts of experiment asked the participants to
report their perception of the modeling technique. Histograms are used to illustrate
the data. As it was mentioned in 6.2.3, the designed questions can be categoried
into 3 classes. In appendix C - post-questionnaire, PU means perceived usefulness
of the modeling technique, ITU means intention to use the modeling technique and
PEOU means perceived ease of use the modeling technique. Since there were 3 neg-
ative questions in the questionnaire, therefore, in order to analyze them in statistical
method, the values were inverted into reverse values by following the critical rule of
“Reverse value = 6-response value”.
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Figure 8.10: Estimating the usage of Textual Description, Diagrams and Memory for Se-
cure Tropos with Health Insurance Case
Figure 8.11: Estimating the usage of Textual Description, Diagrams and Memory for Mis-
use Case with Health Insurance Case
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Figure 8.12: Estimating the usage of Textual Description, Diagrams and Memory for Mis-
use Case with Net Shopping Case
8.1.2 Data Pre-analysis
There is always no standard answers that can provide the rules of removing data point-
ers because of some loose information or uncertain issues. This situation may risk the
experiment results and impact on the conclusion. There are also no good results for any
experiment by comparing the result based on a removed data with the ones that was not
removed data. However, two separate ways of reducing data can be identified:
• Single data points can be removed, for example, outliers or
• All data can be analyzed and derive to the conclusion that due to high inter-correlation
(Cohen 2002)[19] between some variables, in this case we should combine measures
into some abstract measure.
But for this experiment, it was not obviously evident to support for removing any outliers,
because the experiment sample size was not computed in advance. It was difficult to
recruit people. Hence setting the total number of the participants was not a necessary task
for the experiment. Thus, all data was treated as valid for the experiment. Another issue
was the experiment just focus on both modeling diagrams, thus the main analysis was not
the textual description and memory used in the experiment, even so, all these variables
were analyzed in order to derive the conclusion from a multiple view of angle for the
experiment. Hence the useable data was not only estimated usage of diagrams but also the
variables of MIT_THR, MIT_TXT, and MIT_MEM used in the result analysis. Another
reason why all variables were analyzed since there might be risks for the experiment if
these variables were removed because considering the participants’ background, they had
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Figure 8.13: The outlier points of their study background and man-month jobs
limited experience on relevant modeling techniques study. For example, only the UML
use case have been taught in their software engineering class and some non-avoiding risks
(see chapter 12) in this experiment. Combined with all these factors in the experiment, all
the variables were maintained during the data analysis. The comparison of results came
from the non-removed variable set and how the results were analyzed are explained in next
section (see 8.2).
The box plots (figure 8.13) were used to express the new data sets. Most of participants
had no ICT relevant work experience according to the right boxplot figure but there were
three outliers extremely higher than average value. The left figure shows that most of the
participants had 3 semester studies at ICT.
There were 50 participants in total; all the participants were grouped into four groups
where they have tried to use both modeling techniques with two cases. The responses
were coded qualitatively in order to determine exactly how many threats and mitigations
does each participant can identify. The counting rule for the threats and mitigation was
that if the participant was using a conjunction word such as “and”, “or” conjunction word
to conjunct several threats or mitigations, this kind of threat or mitigation was counted
as two threats or mitigations in this experiment. Also, if the mitigation was suggested to
several threats at the same time, this mitigation was counted several times according to
which threats it relates to. When compared the participants’ background and the number
of threats and mitigations they found, there was a simple figure 8.15 as follows which were
illustrating that the participants’ performance were based on their background of relevant
ICT work experience for the ST modeling technique. The data distribution was based on
the background of the participants, the right figure shows the mean value of the threats
they have identified, the left figure illustrates the relevant mitigations that refer to the
threats which the participants have identified relate to their man-month work experience.
All the participants also tried Misuse Cases diagrams modeling approach as their tasks in
the experiment. According to the experiment design in order to reduce the learning effect
during the experiment, each group had to apply different modeling technique-with-case re-
garding to their group number, for example group 1 and group 4 tried to use Secure Tropos
diagrams first but they had different case order (NS or HIS) in the experiment. Figure 8.15
presents that the performance for identified threats and mitigations by two paired groups.
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Figure 8.14: The mean value for Identified Threats and Mitigation compared with partici-
pants’ background.
Figure 8.15: The mean value for Identified Threats and Mitigation compared with partici-
pants’ background.
As well as the figure illustrating in Group 1 and Group 4, the left figure means that the
threats were identified by the participants relate to their job experience. And the right fig-
ure means that the mitigations number refer to the number of threats were identified relate
to their background - the man-month work experience. The estimated the usage of the tex-
tual description, diagrams and memory were designed to collect the response of how the
participants use diagrams, textual description or memory to identify threats and suggest
the mitigations. Hence, it was very important to compare how many percentage they have
used of the two modeling methods to identify threats as expected. The following figure
8.16 gives visualization representative of these data that collected from each group. As
mentioned above, whether the participants through modeling diagrams to identify threats
or suggest mitigations were the most important issue for the results analysis, thus the issues
of showing probability of textual description, memory they have used and other concerns
in a plot figure was omitted here. The figure 8.16 illustrates that detected probabilities
from each group for two modeling techniques in the two parts of the experiment according
to the participants’ self-assessments. The data were distributed from 5% to 95%, for the
each modeling approach the data was distributed vary widely but most of them were range
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Figure 8.16: Probability plot of THR_DIAG(ST), THR_DIAG(MUC)
from 20% to 70% according the participants’ response. This means that the modeling di-
agrams were useful for the participants to finish relevant tasks in the experiment due to
their background with few experience on these two modeling approaches. But for the each
individual, there was different percentage value estimated for using modeling diagrams.
Hence, a further analysis was needed (see 8.2). The post-experiment questionnaire was
used to collected data according to the participants’ self-assessments, it represented their
response as illustrated above (see section 8.1.1). Since the TAM (Davis 1989)[20] was
used to design style to record the participants’ self-assessed perception of the modeling
approaches in the experiment, so no need to reduce any data from these data sets as well.
8.2 Data Analysis
8.2.1 background
Kruskal-Wallis H tests[3] was used for the four independent groups to test the partici-
pants’ background. All background variables were tested and there was no significant
different between the groups with respect to knowledge, study semesters and job months
(See Appendix B). The 2-tailed Wilcoxon sign-rank tests[11] was also used to compare
the participants self-assessed knowledge background in the areas of Use Case v.s. i* mod-
eling diagrams, Misuse Cases v.s. Secure Tropos diagrams and Activity diagrams v.s.
Mal-activity diagrams. According to the results (see appendix B), no obviously significant
difference of background between the participants was found that they had more knowl-
edge about UML use case diagrams and UML activity diagrams other than i* modeling
diagrams and Mal-activity diagrams. According to the analyzed results, significant differ-
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ence was found in the knowledge of Misuse Case diagrams and Secure Tropos diagrams
(p = .009).
Most participants reported 3 semesters of IT studies, with a mean of 3.3 and a higher
standard deviation 1.27 due to the outliers with 5, 7 semesters. They reported 0 - 2 man-
month jobs or internships besides 2 outliers with 5, 7 months. Here the mean was 1.26.
Almost all of them were at the same study level - sophomore students, so they have limited
chance to find a relevant ICT work in summer since Norwegian companies prefer the
interns in or above their third year studies at the higher education level. According to
their responses data and the analyzed results, it was believed that the participants had no
significant difference between the study background and their knowledgeable about secure
modeling approaches. This situation was not a surprise since the participants were chosen
randomly whom study computer science at the IT department.
8.2.2 Performance
The data collecting was done through asking the participants to identify and list as many
threats and mitigations as they can in the specific systems of the experiment. The Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests[11] of two paired groups for the variables THR and MIT was used, using
exact 2-tailed significances to compare how well the participants have identified threats
when they have applied ST and MUC. The average of identified threats by applied both
modeling techniques were 2.54 for Secure Tropos and 2.90 for Misuse Cases (see table
8.1). According to this result (Appendix B), there were no find significant differences in
the number of identified threats between the two modeling approaches when they have
applied techniques with the different cases order(p = .113). Hence, it derives a conclusion
that there were no significant differences of the two modeling techniques to identify the
threats when the participants have applied to the two modeling techniques with relevant
cases.
However, on the contrary, it was found that a significant difference in the number of iden-
tified mitigation between the two modeling approaches (p = .005). Also there were sig-
nificant differences in the number of identified threats and mitigations between the two
modeling approaches (p = 0.004). Hence, to sum up, the conclusion can be derived that
H1 was rejected and H2 and H3 were accepted.
Wilcoxon signed-ranked test[11] was also used to compare the participants’ performance
for the first technique-and-case pair the second technique-and-case they used. All the
variables such as THR, MIT and THMI were tested here. Through analyzed the results,
there were no significant differences in the number of identified threats between the first
half of the experiment and the second half (p = .076). However, there were significant
differences in the number identified mitigation between the first half of experiment and
the second half experiment (P = 0.014). It may be due to frigates during the experiment
because there were only 10 minutes for the participants to have a rest between the two
parts of experiment.
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Table 8.1: Comparison results for performance
Identification task MUC Mean MUC St. Dev value ST Mean ST St. Dev value
Threats(THR) 2.90 1.39 2.54 1.30
Mitigation (MIT) 2.94 2.03 2.27 1.51
Both(THMI) 5.84 3.02 4.80 2.32
8.2.3 Estimating of the usage of diagrams, textual description and
memory
There was a completely blank sheet of responding on estimated used diagrams, which
came from the group 2. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests[11] was performed for the two paired
groups with exact significances and the two paired groups were applied for the variables
concerning the estimated use of diagrams when solving the performance task. The results
were presented in table 8.2. Except testing the variables of THR_DIAG and MIT_DIAG,
all other variables were also tested too (see Appendix B). According to the results, there
were significant differences between the use of textual description to identify threats (p
= .001) and using memory to suggest mitigations (p= .025). When the participants have
used textual description to suggest mitigations, it was obviously that there were significant
differences between Secure Tropos diagrams and Misuse Cases diagrams (P = .013).
Meanwhile, two cases were compared in order to see if there were any significant differ-
ences between the two modeling techniques when the participants tried to estimate the use
of diagrams, textual description and memory in the experiment. There were significant
difference of using diagrams to identify threats between Secure Tropos and Misuse Case
(p = .035) for the NS case but no significant differences were found between the modeling
techniques for the HIS case (p = .065). When using textual description to identify threats,
there were also no found that the participants have displayed significant differences in both
two cases - NS and HIS. But they have used the same cases with different modeling tech-
niques, there were significant differences between the two modeling techniques with the
same cases (NS p= .050, HIS p = .011).
In order to increase the reliability of the assessment for two cases which were used in the
experiment, from the opposite view of the estimated the usage of two modeling techniques,
the cases with the same security modeling techniques were also tested in the stage of data
analysis. For example the two cases with ST modeling technique were tested in order to
see whether there were significant differences between the participants’ performance for
the cases. It was obviously found the significant difference between two cases with the
modeling diagram to identify threats(p = .025) and signigicant difference between two
cases with textual description to identfy the threats (p = .007). This may due to the com-
plexity of the case, thus this was the reason why a further analyzed the data of participants’
perception was need (see 8.2.4).
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Table 8.2: Estimating the usage of diagrams, textual description and memory
Variables MUC Mean MUC St. Dev value ST Mean ST St. Dev value
THR_DIAG 0.54 0.02 0.29 0.26
THR_TXT 0.25 0.19 0.41 0.28
THR_MEM 0.31 0.25 0.30 0.23
MIT_DIAG 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.24
MIT_MEM 0.41 0.32 0.33 0.31
MIT_THR 0.24 0.26 0.21 0.27
MIT_TXT 0.15 0.16 0.23 0.24
8.2.4 Perception
Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of two paired groups were applied for all perception variables
using 2-tailed significances to compare how the participants perceived the techniques in
terms of usefulness (PU) and ease of use (PEOU) and whether they intended to use them
again in the future (ITU). The results show that the participants perceived Secure Tropos
significantly more positively than Misuse Case (see table 8.3), perceived usefulness (p=
.000), perceived ease of use (p= .000) and intention to use (p = .000) and average for all
perception questions (p = .000). Hence, hypotheses 6, 7, 8 and 9 were all confirmed.
Meanwhile, all individual question in this section was tested as well. A significant result
for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was obtained that the participants were in favor of ST,
except question 5, this did not give a significant result in either direction for both modeling
approaches either. This was related to the PU variable and stated that the technique “would
be useless in finding system security issues” (p = .054). All other statements were found
significant difference between the two modeling approaches when the participants applied
during the experiment (see Appendix B). The acceptable experiment type I error probabil-
ity was 0.05 and the type II error probability was 0.20. Since the experiment compared two
modeling technique groups, thus N/2 units were needed in each group (Hopkins 2001)[36].
According to the calculated effect size in table 8.4, the relevant characteristics were con-
firmed, such as the pooled standard deviation[6], effect size[17]. Because there were two
modeling approaches in the experiment, it was therefore that the means-Wilcoxcon-Mann-
Whitney test [65](two groups) could be used (Faul 2009) (Faul 2007)[28] [29]under the
t-test family to compute the determined sample size. Two groups construct the total sample
size, so each of the group has a half number of total samples.
Wilcoxon signed-ranked test was also applied to compare the participants’ average per-
ceptions for the HIS case and NS case when compared the first technique they applied
with the second one. Significant differences were found that the participants significantly
favored Net Shopping case (P = .001) when they have applied Secure Tropos diagrams.
Their responses were that it was easy to use MUC when they used case Net Shopping (p =
.011). Combination of the analysis for estimating of usage of textual description, diagrams
and memory where the participants’ self-report in the experiment, the conclusion for this
kind of issues can be explained that the Net Shopping case was closer to the participants’
daily life and they may touched this kind of transaction frequently.
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Table 8.3: Perceived usefulness (PU), ease of use (PEOU), intention to use (ITU)
TAM Variables MUC Mean MUC St. Dev ST Mean ST St. Dev Sign. (exact)
THR_DIAG 0.45 0.02 0.29 0.26 p=.003
MIT_DIAG 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.24 p = .634
PU 2.50 0.36 3.01 0.42 p=.000
PEOU 2.18 0.54 3.06 0.70 p= .000
ITU 2.13 0.54 3.02 0.72 p = .000
AVE 2.34 0.51 3.02 0.62 p= .000
Table 8.4: Effect and sample size for the significant differences in perception (SM: samll,
MED: medium, Lar: large)
Variables Pooled st.dev. Effect size Cohen Hopkins Sample size required
PU 0.39 -1.30 Lar Lar 22
PEOU 0.63 -1.40 Lar Lar 20
ITU -1.39 Lar Lar Lar 20
AVE 0.57 -1.22 Lar Lar 26
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Chapter 9
Experiment - Findings
This chapter discusses the results by summarizing and interpreting the main findings in
chapter 8. A possible further development of techniques with classification of threat types
are also suggested in this chpater.
9.1 Main findings
Table 9.1: Result of Hypothesis testing
ID Description Result
H11 There will be a significant difference in the number of
identified threats between the two groups.
Reject
H21 There will be a significant difference in the number of
identified mitigations between the two groups.
Accept
H31 There will be a significant difference in the number
of identified threats and mitigations between the two
groups.
Accept
H41 There will be a significant difference in the estimated
use of the diagrams of the two techniques in identifying
threats.
Accept
H51 There will be a significant difference in the estimated
use of the diagrams of the two techniques in identifying
mitigations.
Reject
H61 The two techniques will be perceived significantly dif-
ferently regarding usefulness.
Accept
H71 The two techniques will be perceived significantly dif-
ferently regarding ease of use.
Accept
H81 The two techniques will be intended to be used signifi-
cantly differently.
Accept
Continued on next page
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Table 9.1 – continued from previous page
ID Description Result
H91 The two techniques will be perceived significantly dif-
ferently.
Accept
Table 11.1 summarizes the results for the main hypotheses. As it was mentioned in pre-
vious chapters, this experiment comparison was indicating that the two techniques were
complementary in terms of comprehensive understanding.
The subjective was sophomore students at the department of Computer and Information
Science, NTNU. The reason why they were chosen as the participants can be discussed
into two parts.
Firstly, since they were sophomore students who have been taught software engineering,
thus they had the knowledge of UML use case modeling technique, and they had expe-
rience on using this technique in their exercise or project in their course works. Because
they were in the same organization in the department of XCom’13, according to the outline
of bachelor education, they may had very similar education background in the university’s
level of studies. Thus, it was easier to control their background if they have been chosen as
the experiment sample. Even through some participants had experience on relevant ICT in-
ternships, but according to results analysis there were no signification differences between
their background in knowledge of determining the experiment modeling techniques.
The second reason why they were chosen as the participants since it was also easier for us
to motivate them to participate in the experiment because they always secure founding to
extrusion, we can offer some money to them, hence the participants had higher motivation
to took in the experiment that was really good news for the experiment.
Participants prefer to use Secure Tropos other than Misuse Case. However, there were no
significant differences between the two modeling techniques to identify threats (p= .113).
On the contrary, the participants suggested significant differences in the number of iden-
tified mitigations between this two modeling techniques (p= .005). This might be caused
by the cases complexity when they tried to use the two modeling techniques (see 8.2). As
it was planned, the next step was data analyzing from the responses of the participants
estimated usage of textual description, diagrams and memory. According to the analyzed
results there were significant differences between the use of textual description (p=.001)
and memory to identify threats (p=.025). There were also significant differences between
Secure Tropos and Misuse Case when the participants using textual description to suggest
mitigation (p=.013). However, when compared the cases where the participants have used
textual description, diagram and memory to identify threats in the addition of the same
modeling technique with the same case, it was obviously significant differences between
Secure Tropos and Misuse Case diagrams for Net Shopping case (p= .025). There were
also significant differences between ST and MUC when the participants have used textual
description for Net Shopping case (p= .007).
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Therefore, the conclusion can be derived that Net Shopping case might be easier for partic-
ipants to identify mitigations since this case was closer to their daily life. And it was also
can concluded that Secure Tropos was preferred by the participants in the following sev-
eral reasons. Secure Tropos is a kind of goal-based modeling technique; the participants
could identify their security goals if they read the textual description of cases carefully,
they can find the system’s goals, sub-goals and the constraints between them. Then they
might suggest high level threats and mitigation even though they had not focus on details
of modeling diagrams. However, for Misuse Case, after they read the diagrams, partici-
pants can identify most of the threats and mitigations since the diagrams were illustrating
systems’ threats in low level, they can master this technique refer to their experience on
UML use case. They might less focus on the textual description when they have identified
threats or mitigations. Hence, when the participants have suggested mitigations, they may
impacted by the characteristics of the two modeling techniques. Therefore, there were
significant differences in using the two modeling approaches and their perceptions on the
two modeling techniques. And according to the analyzed results, ST was received more
intent to use in the future, the mean value was 3.02 with the standard deviation was 0.72.
The mean value of MUC was 2.13 with the standard deviation was 0.54.
9.2 Other findings
According to the participants’ response, there was another reason that also might impact
on the experiment results, such as the threats and mitigation types. After looking though all
the experiment sheets the participants filled in. An interesting thing was found according
to their responses on each modeling technique with relevant cases. Hence, it was worthy
to categorize their answers in order to find some valuable suggestions for both modeling
approaches.
A tree figure 9.1 illustrates that the responses can be divided into two main classifications
based on the type of threats or mitigations. It was found that for Secure Tropos diagram,
most of the participants suggested threats and mitigations were based on the non-technique
aspect. On the contrary, the participants suggested most of threats and mitigation for
Misuse Case diagrams were based on technique aspect. Thus, the definition here are used
to classify the technique and non-technique responses:
Technique aspect response The student gives the response to identify the threats and mit-
igation based on technical description such as authorization, biometric technique,
availability and confidentially. E.g., the server shall be able to identify the attacks
and can protect it for avoiding crash, or when pay the payment to bank system, the
technique shall use “https” to protect the data communication and so forth.
Non-technique aspect response The student suggests that those threats and mitigation
based on integrity, human mistakes and physical errors. E.g., HIC makes mistake to
update the database that will inform the patient to pay the payment.
However, the quality of the threats were hard to control since there was no standard tem-
plate for the participants to use when they identify threats for both two cases, therefore,
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Figure 9.1: The main categories for threats of the experiment
it was difficult to evaluate their responses due to the vary evaluation criterion of different
people. Hence, their responses were just classified in a high level category and could not
go into the details or sub-categories. However, this finding was still sprit the idea that the
further research direction will be correct according to the statistical analysis for the future
experiment. Although the results were in many ways as expected, it still feels useful to
have such suspicious confirmed by controlled experiments rather than letting them remain
on the purely speculative level. For instance, the boilerplates [60] can be used for helping
the participants to organize their response of threats and mitigations in a standard way, this
will be easier for researchers to evaluate and classify their responses in details and also
can be used to confirm more lower level threats or mitigation types of the two modeling
techniques.
Furthermore, as shown in the table 9.1, that results of this experiment were not partic-
ularly surprising. Secure Tropos was better for the identify threats and mitigations of a
system from the high level of pre-requirements and requirements for the system security
analysis, and Misuse Cases was better for system’s low level requirements analysis, espe-
cially the technique aspect before a real implementation such as the stage of system design
as suspected. As for the participants’ preference towards Secure Tropos, there were sev-
eral possible issues of occurring of this situation, this may plausibly be explained by the
fact that the students were like analyze the possible functional of a system in the stage of
pre-requirements and high level requirements but no need to go further of the low levels
security analysis. If they do not need to further analyze the cases but just finish an exper-
iment, the MUC may just considered as non-prior for the analysis of a system due to the
request by experimenters. However, both modeling techniques had no significant differ-
ent to identify threats, it can be explained that the students had few experience on both
modeling techniques, the experiment was the first time to let them know these modeling
approaches for analyzing the security concerns. Hence„ when the students have identified
the mitigations for threats they found, the mitigations might not only based on their feed-
back on the estimated the usage of diagrams, textual description and memory, but also their
experience, such as some feedback suggested from biometric technique and non-technique
areas.
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Chapter 10
Experiment - Findings Discussion
In the previous project work, six dimensions were classified for the two modeling families-
i*-based and Use Case-based modeling techniques[53]. A discussion of the results found
in the experiment was compared with the previous classification (see chapter 3), to see
whether the findings in this experiment were also claim the same idea in the previous
project work.
10.1 Representation perspective and level of abstraction
As well known that ST is a Goal-based modeling, it is used for modeling and analysis of
the system’s security constraints as the attainment of security goals. On the contrary, the
MUC is a Model-based or Problem-based modeling technique. MUC is a kind of modeling
notation based on the UML or variants, or extensions of it, and probably allows modeling
and analysis of different threats using formal or informal means to identify threats and
possible mitigations to the threats[54].
Considering the number and type of the threats and mitigations identified by the partic-
ipants when they have applied the two modeling approaches and their self-report back-
ground in the experiment, there were no significant differences found between the two
modeling techniques when they have identified number of the threats (p= .113). How-
ever, an interesting finding was that there were significant differences in the number of
identified mitigation between the two modeling approaches(p= .005). According to the
answer of their responses (see section 9.2), it was found that the participants gave more
high level suggestions for the case with ST modeling technique. But there were more tech-
nical suggestions for the case with MUC modeling technique. All of them had been taught
the UML use case modeling technique in their software engineering course before they
took part in the experiment. Thus, they may be more familiar with the Use Case-based
modeling techniques for analyzing the system.
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It was not surprise that they suggested technical solutions for the cases with MUC mod-
eling technique. Hence, compared with the previous work, it can be confirmed that these
findings claim as the same in the dimension of characterization of “representation per-
spective and level of abstraction” : the ST modeling technique is a Goal-based modeling
technique, practitioners may more focus on the security goals of a system, but when they
have to identify threats from technical view of a system or low level analysis of a sys-
tem, Model-based or Problem-based modeling technique might be a good choice, such as
MUC.
10.2 Kind of SRE tasks/activities
The activity classes were extracted from the recent 10 years work by several scholars[46][26]
[59][31][47][41][42][45]. The following paragraphs illustrate each sub-class that whether
the two modeling approaches’ benefits were confirmed by the experiment or not. The table
summarizes the characteristics were confirmed in the experiment.
Table 10.1: Confirmed characteristics in the dimension of “kind of security re-
quirement engineering (SRE) tasks/activities”
Characteristics Confirmed Not confirmed
Security Objective Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Identification and modeling of Assets (IMA) ST: not support IMA, MUC: support
IMA
None
Identification of Vulnerabilities(VT) Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Elicitation and Analysis of SRs(EAS) Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Specification of SRs (S) Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Documentation of SRs (DS) Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Verfication and Validation support (VVS) Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
1. Security Objectives presents the high-level requirements or goals that are most im-
portant to customers. According to the participants’ performance in the experiment,
even though there were no find significant differences between the two modeling
techniques when they have identified threats, it was still noticed that the participants
stand on the customers behalf to analyze the cases when they used ST, such as their
responses of mitigations for the threats they found and its types. MUC was also
fulfilling with this class since the threats and mitigations that the participants have
found were also focus on the security goals for the cases.
2. Identification and modeling of Assets (IMA) presents the entities that are considered
valuable, and a possible target of threat, should be protected. The participants be-
havior were the same as claimed in the previous work that ST was not support this
feature but MUC supported, according to their non-technique threats suggestions
for ST with two cases. But they gave technique threats and mitigation suggestion
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for MUC with the two cases. Thus, MUC can fulfills with this requirements.
3. Identification of Vulnerabilities and Threats (VT) presents the ability of identifica-
tion of software defects that can be exploited by an attacker to cause harm, and what
could be an attacker’s target. After analyzed the responses from the experiment
sheets, it was realized that the participants can just identified threats when they have
applied MUC but no potential threats were suggested when they have applied ST.
This also confirms the previous claim that ST was not support VT but MUC just
supported to identify threats.
4. Elicitation and Analysis of SRs (EAS) presents the ability to derive security require-
ments from other sources and to analyze the security requirements to achieve com-
plete and unambiguous requirements. It was found that there were significant dif-
ferences between the two modeling techniques when the participants’ have applied
diagrams to identify the threats (p=.003) but no significant differences when they
have used diagrams to suggested mitigations (p= .643). Except the diagrams, the
textual description and memory were also the extra sources for the participants to
analyze the security requirements. When the participants have used textual descrip-
tion to identify threats, there were significant differences between two modelling
approaches (p = .001). When the participants have used memory to identify miti-
gations there were significant differences between two modelling approaches (p =
.025). When the participants have used textual description to identify mitigations,
there were significant differences between two modelling approaches (p = .013).
Although there were differences between the two modeling techniques during the
experiment execution, both of the two modeling techniques can fulfill with this clas-
sification due to the extra sources to support analyze the security requirements to
achieve complete and unambiguous criterion.
5. Specification and Documentation of SRs (S and DS), Verification and validation
support (VVS) presents the use of informal or formal methods to document security
requirements developed through elicitation and analysis, and its ability to document
requirements in a way to ensure visibility, traceability. Formal methods or other ver-
ification and validation approaches guarantee that the security requirements are cor-
rect, consistent, complete and unambiguous. According the participants’ responses
(their self-assessed, number of identified threats or mitigations), it was obtained that
the participants understood the two modeling approaches generally and they could
gave their suggestion of threats and mitigations regarding to the modeling approach
with cases that they have used in the experiment. As claimed in the previous work,
it was verified that both modeling techniques can fulfilled with S and DS, but for the
VVS the participant suggested more threats and mitigations from technique aspects,
so the security requirements may just be able to understand by technique staffs in-
stead of non-professional stakeholders of the system. Hence, it was confirmed that
MUC can only support internal verification of VVS and ST cannot support the VVS.
Since the identified high level and non-technique threats or mitigations cannot guar-
antee the requirements’ correct, consistent, or complete and unambiguous.
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10.3 Technical criteria and specification criteria
Technical criteria and specification criteria are closely related because in order to fulfill
technical criteria all specification criteria related to that technical criterion must be fulfilled
as well. Since further analyzing of type and quality of the threats and mitigations were not
analyzed, it was too difficult to control the responses quality of the participants and the
responses were range vary from non-technique aspects to technique aspects. For instance,
human behavior mistakes in the HIS case like the doctor make a mistake to diagnose a
patient health status, and biometric technique have been used in the case of NS to avoid
salesperson sales goods to himself or herself. Hence, just a rough classification of types of
threats and mitigations were given in the experiment results.
Furthermore, the experiment did not ask the participants to draw the diagram instead of
asking them to self-assess the perception of the two modeling techniques. According
to their responses and the experiment designer’s (author’s perception) during the design
process of the experiment, the criteria in the dimension of “Technical and specification
criteria” was partially verified. Others criteria might need a further experiment to test,
such as “Standard integration”, “Support for other development stages”. The table 10.2
illustrates the confirmed criteria in the experiment.
Table 10.2: Confirmed characteristics in the dimension of “Specification and
technical criteria”
Characteristics Confirmed Not con-
firmed
Internal verification
support
Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
External verification
support
Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Support documentation
generation
Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Standards integration None A further
confir-
mation is
needed
Requirements reuse Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Support for other devel-
opment stages
None A further
confir-
mation is
needed
Continued on next page
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Table 10.2 – continued from previous page
Characteristics Confirmed Not con-
firmed
Help support and easy
to use
Both ST and MUC were confirmed Participants
did not
state any
easy to use
model from
the two
modeling
techniques
10.4 Modeling Language, Process and Method
This dimension is capable of promoting understanding of how an initiative can be applied.
Through processing of the two case textual description and pre-drawn diagrams for the
two cases, the following criteria were verified for both modeling techniques: ability to for-
mulate basic security requirements, usage scenarios, similarity with software specification
languages and tool support. As the dimension was cited in the previous work, MUC has
no ability to represent security mechanisms and low level security requirements. For ex-
ample when the buyers pay the payment to the system, the security criteria for password,
account number and user name verification cannot illustrate in a detail diagram but the ST
can fulfill this criteria. Due to the design constraints of the experiment, it was difficult
to verify the rest criteria, such as “reuse of provided artifacts in later phase”, “develop-
ment resources”, “reusable artifacts” and “usage in the industry”. Certainly, these stage of
points were also not the main concerns of this experiment either.
Table 10.3: Confirmed characteristics in the dimension of “modeling language,
process and method”
Characteristics Confirmed Not con-
firmed
Ability to formu-
late basic security
requirements
Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Ability to represent us-
age scenarios
ST: not support IMA, MUC: support
IMA
None
Ability to represent se-
curity mechanisms and
low level security re-
quirements
Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Continued on next page
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Table 10.3 – continued from previous page
Characteristics Confirmed Not con-
firmed
Similarity with soft-
ware specification
languages
Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Reuse of provided arti-
facts in later phase
None Both ST
and MUC
were not
confirmed
Tool support Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Development resources None Both ST
and MUC
were not
confirmed
Reusable artifacts None Both ST
and MUC
were not
confirmed
Usage in the industry None Both ST
and MUC
were con-
firmed
10.5 Relevant SRE notation and Software Evolution and
Other Perspectives
The case description and pre-drawn security modeling diagrams were illustrated fully of
the SRE notations as classified in this dimension. Since the experiment did not ask the
participants to identify the system’s vulnerabilities but just asked them to identify the threat
and its relevant mitigation. Thus, the vulnerabilities criteria cannot be investigated here.
But others can be investigated by the experiment design and the participants’ performance
and perception in the dimension of relevant SRE notation (see table 10.4).
Meanwhile, according to the design of the case and its security modeling diagrams, the
perception of the modeling techniques can help to make a judgment of software evolu-
tion and other perspective dimensions. For instance, the modularity is a measure of the
separation of concerns and possibility of developing software components independently
and its application. Both modeling techniques were not good at this feature, because ST
diagram combined all security constraints together, so it is hard to only consider one con-
straint individually. MUC was better than ST but still cannot fully support developer only
to consider some separately security goals.
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The criteria of component architecture that is a level of support for a component-based
structure. It allows software modules to be added or removed easily. It is impossible to
add or remove any modules from the ST diagram since the ST diagram may lose security
constraints, also cannot guarantee the secure entity if doing so. It will destroy the exits
security constraints and the security logics of a system. The same with MUC, if trying
to do the same behaviors in a MUC system diagram, although it is still possible to add
or remove one individual misuse case diagram from the entire misuse case diagram of a
system, it is still harm to entire security of the system.
As analyzed in the component architecture, ST modeling technique is low support to
“change propagation”, since it is hard to change or remove any constraint in an entire
ST diagram. Therefore, the ST has low ability to keep track of changes made to system
and only can limited guarantee the change is correctly propagated, such as no inconsistent
dependency was left unresolved. For example, if we change one place in the system, it will
impact on others in the system’s security constraints or damage the whole system’s secu-
rity constraints. However, the MUC can low support component architecture, but there is
a possible that the changes in the system cannot be tracked correctly.
Due to low support of modularity for a system, ST has low ability to evaluate the effect
that changes made to specific artifacts. The same, MUC is medium support modularity of
a system, thus analyzing the change impact of a system is a possible thing.
Table 10.4: Confirmed characteristics in the dimension of “Relevant SRE notions
and Software evolution support”
Characteristics Confirmed Not con-
firmed
Security goal Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Security requirements Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Specification Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Stakeholder Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Asset MUC was confirmed ST was not
confirmed
Threats Both ST and MUC were confirmed None
Vulnerabilities None Both ST
and MUC
were not
confirmed
Risks/Mitigation Both ST and MUC were not confirmed None
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Chapter 11
Suggestions based on the Results
of the Experiment
11.1 Suggestions for the Two Modeling Techniques
The first suggestion based on the experiment results is to combine the Secure Tropos with
other related modeling techniques. In this way it can provide complete security models
for the system development. The entire system development duration can be divided into:
identify requirement, identify scenarios of the system, design of the system, implemen-
tation, testing, and evaluation. As indicated, ST is used for the stage of analyzing the
system, such as identify security requirements, and identify scenarios of the system. For
instance analyst can through the textual description of the system to obtain the information
and extract information from the meeting with the customers. As expressed in the experi-
ment results, the participants preferred Secure Tropos, since the Secure Tropos expressed
the system’s security issues directly. As one of the i*-based modeling techniques, ST has
good ability to involve all the stakeholders of the system. Non-professional staff can also
participant in the system analysis, hence it can help to avoid the systems’ non-usability if
the system is just analyzed and developed by IT professionals.
Hence, if using Secure Tropos to analyze the system in the stage of system security re-
quirements, boilerplate as a method to illustrate the security requirements in general nat-
ural language of the system should be a better way for the system designer to design the
system other than only use the Use Case-based modeling techniques. And it is also useful
when using ST to illustrate the systems’ security constraints in the ST diagrams. Through
this way, the development team can create systems’ scenarios and model the scenarios that
are face to both the stakeholders and the developers. After pre-analyzing the system’s se-
curity concerns from multiple stakeholders of the system, it would be easier for developer
to understand the requirements precisely and to do a further action, such as how many
security constraints in the system, and how many security concerns should be considered
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Figure 11.1: Life cyclic of system development[9]
before the project implementation.
The second suggestion is that because the UML sequence diagrams (USD) are very well
known. Thus, if Secure Tropos can be involved into the model-driven development of
system to generate relevant derivative framework, it would be also easier for developer to
reduce the programming time. Furthermore, MUC is better than ST in low-level security
requirements analysis, ST also medium support the criteria of modularity in the software
evolution. Therefore, it is good for further analysis and design the system based on the
first step by using ST method in the early and late stages of the requirements process, and
just leave the rest things to MUC. MUC can be used to analyze and design the security
constraints and its diagrams. It is also ensure that test-driven development (TDD) and agile
development methods can be used in the software development.
Third, the main disadvantage of MUC are that MUC is based on informal analysis, hence
MUC has no clear semantics; there is also no formal analysis of MUC. How to write
a good quality MUC is also not clearly indicated. Contemporary, the technique is only
focusses on the system-to-be, so it is not suitable for identify all kinds of threats, such as
the non-technique aspect threats. The identifiable misuser and misuse case may not always
consist of an identifiable sequence of actions. Consequently, a guideline for writing a good
quality MUC is very usefulness. With good quality MUC, the ST can be used for help to
illustrate the security mechanisms and low level security requirements. And other good
features of ST, such as structural, exclusive and heavy weight development processes, and
relevant formal approach, that can ensure the security concerns of a system could be more
clearly. Therefore, they also indrectly ensure that the misuser and misuse cases may also
can identifiable and accurate.
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11.2 Suggestions for the future work
Yet, further investigation is needed to explore how well the Secure Tropos modeling tech-
nique combines with Misuse Cases modeling technique to develop the system/software,
like a case study. The results still need to be tested in the future. Assuredly, there is still
need a tool to support and realize the goal of the further project. Since there is already de-
veloped a tool can be used for analyzing the security requirements in the “ReqSec” project
where researcher post-doctor Olawande Daramola preformed an experiment to test that
tool. The method he used to identified security requirements was boilerplate[1]. Hence, If
these “standard” security requirements can use in Secure Tropos diagrams or from Secure
Tropos diagrams drive the relevant security requirements in natural language as the boil-
erplate template as a format for the threats identification. It will be a good idea to help the
system designer and analysts to draw the related use-cases diagrams to help a good under-
standing of the system security concerns in the develop team. Also, it is a good opportunity
for researcher to identify the types of threats or mitigations are found by the participants.
Even through the software is still under construct, if i*-based modeling technique and Use
Case-based modeling technique can be embedded, the system development could be more
complete from analyze requirements to system design. That might be help to avoid both
modeling approaches’ disadvantages. Since all the stakeholders will be involved in the
system development, it also can reduce the misunderstanding at the stage of analyzing the
security requirement engineering. Hence, the security concerns would be more meticulous
analyzed by the system analyst before the system is built.
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Chapter 12
Experiment - Threats to Validity
This chapter discusses four kinds of validities, which may occur in the experiment. Since
the experiment was constructing as controlled experiment, it was therefore that there may
existed issues of which cannot avoid during the execution and the design of the experiment.
12.1 Conclusion validity
The conclusion validity is concerned with the relationship between the technique used in
this experiment and the outcome in kind of score of the experiment[17]. One important
issue here was the sample size of the experiment. It was very important to make sure
that sample size was enough to help to justify the conclusions drawn in the significant
cases. The main effect claimed from the performance data was a significant advantage for
Secure Tropos regarding the perceived ease of use (p= .000). The results show that 20
participants are needed or more that can give the chosen probabilities for type I and type
II errors. hence the following relationship is satisfied:
N =
4(µα
2
+ µβ)
ES2
Since type I and type II errors had been already chosen, therefore, there is a formula shall
be use:
N =
32
ES2
(Claes Wohin 2000) [18]. Thus, in this case the effect size of 1.40 yields N = 20 would
be needed to observe the efficiency in the experiment. Hence, the sample size (50 par-
ticipants) was enough to justify the main conclusions in the experiment. However it was
noted that the effect sizes must be used with caution, because the data distribution were
not in general normally. There were also existing random irrelevancies in the experiment
setting, for example, one student sitting in the front of the room went to toilet during the
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experiment other than the break time. It might impact other participants by distracting
their attention from work. The participants may be heterogeneous being in same organi-
zation, having similar background. This might reduce external validity of the experiment
too. However, choosing more non-heterogeneous groups were difficult at university since
the students had big study pressure and lots of exercises, and participate the experiment
at a fixed time were an overwhelming impossible task. Hence, these 50 participants had a
superiority that they can take in the experiment at the fixed time.
12.2 Internal validity
The internal validity is concerned with whether some validities threat the conclusion about
a possible relationship between treatment and outcome can be shown[17].
Grouping the participants bias might occur. For example, it was unknown that the partic-
ipants in one group may more motivate and suited for a new task than the other groups
previously. Latin-Squares experimental design of the experiment was a solution for this
threat, where all participants tried both techniques. The Latin-Squares experimental de-
sign was also solved the problems such as learning effects, boredom or fatigue as the
participants tried the pre-set sequences for each randomly group. Furthermore, the booked
auditorium for executing the experiment was big enough, thus there was adequate spaces
to distribute seats to participants, so all the participants were in the same auditorium with
equal working conditions without interaction between them during the entire experiment.
The experiment contexts were also selected without any bias due to the participants’ re-
sponse on the pre-questionnaire, this may avoid the social threats to internal validity, such
as resentful demoralization and compensatory rivalry. Because both modeling approaches
with cases were new to the participants, so they may not give up and had motivate to do a
good job, while learning something new.
Moreover, existing previous knowledge threats to internal validity was also threat to the
experiment. It was hard to control the previous knowledge and learns of relative expe-
rience before the participants took into the experiment, which were potentially affecting
both performance and preference for the two modeling approaches. Previous knowledge
was hard to control although there was a pre-experiment questionnaire was designed to
control the participants’ background. However, all the participants were all from the same
organization where they had almost the same classes at the same the department during
their computer science studies at IDI due to their study level and the department’s educa-
tion plan for sophomore student. It was also investigated that there was no previous courses
relative to both modeling approaches have been taught to the participants before the ex-
periment, especially the security modeling approaches. But according to the knowledge
of the author, the participants have been taught about software engineering in their third
semester studies at IDI, so they may familiar with use cases from the software engineering
course which may impact on the participants’ bias in favor of Misuse case diagrams, but
the experiment results were proved this threat was invalid.
The introduction to the both two modeling approaches may also have bias if one technique
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was presented in a better way or more positivity than the other. It was felt that an issue
of presenting the experiment techniques should in balance but even the author made every
possible attempt to write the introduction to the both modeling approaches in a balance
way, such as a similar structure and the same complexity to understand, there was still
exist threats from the bias of individual participant who prefer one introduction than the
other.
Moreover, the expected time for the experiment was enough for each section. But there
were still exist threats to the experiment if the participants felt the introduction to the
modeling approach was too short in each part of experiment. The experiment only gave
participants limited time to read the relevant technique with a case. The introduction to
each modeling approach was only 8 minutes; therefore such a short time was likely to
lead to participants’ favor an easily learnt technique other than a harder one when they
try to use the relevant modeling technique, such as the notations of the two modeling
approaches and the way to use these notations in the example section of the experiment.
Furthermore, 35 minutes for the rest parts in each modeling technique in the experiment
may also too short. Participants may like to identify and express easy-to-find threats and
mitigations. After analyzing the participants’ responses, it was showed that even some of
the participants had experience on MUC and no experience on ST; they still were able to
use Secure Tropos correctly after they read the introduction to the ST and its examples
in the experiment sheets, all of them were able to identify a small number of threats in
both cases. Frankly, according to their responses, within a limited time the participants
were prefer to use Secure Tropos because ST modeling technique seems more sociality
and they can identify threats and mitigations by non-technical method to express. Thus,
only further experiments with more introduction time can assess the impact of limited time
on the results.
The analyzing process might also be a threat, for example if the author was more willing
to count the identified threats. In order to reduce this kind of threats, a rule was set that
all the identified threats was treated as one or more threats depending on their description.
For instance if their description including several conjunctions such as “or”, “and”, the
author counted them as several threats due to the word the participants used. The same
as the threats, if mitigation was suggested to several threats; this mitigation was treated as
several mitigations relate to which threat was paired. However, the better way to coding
the scoring the threats by multiple external experts, but it was too hard to find a person to
involve in this work since the work was the author’s master thesis.
The two modeling approaches backgrounds were not introduced to the participant as well.
Since Misuse Case was the author’s professor whose invention, so the author and author’s
two post-doctor supervisors had more experience and knowledge of MUC. However, as
mentioned, the author’s two post-doctor supervisors were responsible to contract the par-
ticipants and they did not mention any detail information of experiment, such as the tech-
nique name that used in the experiment before the execution of the experiment. In this
way it avoids threat that if the participants tried to search some information on the internet
in order to know the experiment techniques in advance.
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12.3 Construct validity
Construct validity is concerned with the extent to which the measurement of the data were
relevant to the hypotheses[17]. The main concerns were the threats and mitigations of the
effectiveness and coverage of the respective techniques, also with estimated the usage of
diagrams, textual description and memory to identify threat or mitigations. These were
measured in terms of the identified number of threats and mitigation, and the estimated
percentages of the usage of diagrams, textual description and memory.
The experiment only had a brief introduction for each method, and a short example was
introduced to the participants to apply each threat-analysis modeling approach. Hence,
the experiment may not explore the full breadth of either technique, then there might be
a risk that the participants did not use the techniques but rather brainstormed threats and
mitigations in an ad hoc manner. However, according to the results, these limitations
would apply to both modeling techniques and could not explain the significant differences
in effectiveness.
And yet, It was also uncertain that all the participants measured threats and mitigations
in the condition of they already understood the concepts and ways to use both modeling
techniques. Although their outputs were scored by quantity, the quality of threats and
mitigations were also worth to analyze. However, to control the quality of threats and
mitigations were a hard task since each person has his/her own criteria of the answers.
Thus, it was a difficult issue to control the output of the quality of threats and mitigation
and taking them into account of the experiment analysis. Therefore, it would be interesting
to perform new experiments, e.g., with a template that can be used the participants, and
where a distinction between major and minor threats and their mitigations have already
been made, the participants’ may just select which one they think is match their thinking
of the threat analysis. Such as boilerplates [1][60] to identify threats and mitigation is a
good method for researcher to analyze the quality of threats and mitigation. In this way,
coding is less of a problem.
There was a threat concerns with issues related to behavior of the participants and experi-
ment. When the participants took part in the experiment, they might try to figure out what
the purpose and intend result of the experiment is. So they may guess the hypotheses, ei-
ther positively or negatively, depending on their attitude to the anticipated hypotheses. For
instance, they may give guess numbers on the estimating of usage tasks in each modeling
technique of experiment, also may give oppose number in the post-questionnaire to realize
their purpose.
12.4 External validity
The external validity is concerned with the conditions that may limit the researcher’s abil-
ity to generalize the results of the experiment to other situations, mostly to industrial sys-
tems development[17].
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The participants of this experiment were the sophomore students with the background of
Computer Science or Informatics. As the study plan for bachelor study level, they may
little focus on security concerns refer to their courses when they have developed software.
However, the practitioner who severed as developer who may have a higher competence
in security concerns. Therefore, there is a possibly bigger difference between students
and practitioners. Apparently, the practitioner may more sensitive for security modeling
techniques. But, for an information system development, the stakeholders shall be not only
the technique staff but also non-IT professionals, such as system end-users and project
managers. Thus, it was also a reason why students were chosen as the participants since
they were believed fulfill with both rules of technique and non-technique staffs as the real
life situation required.
Both systems were described by one page of documentation only, for each system the
participants just had 20 minutes to read text and diagrams, and then they were required to
find threats and their mitigation within 10 minutes. Even though the complexities of both
cases were reduced in order to make the experiment more understandable for participants.
However, the system maybe still very complex and more documentation and more time
needed when the participants try to identify the threats and their mitigations. Also if they
may cooperate together to reach the same goal, it might be easier to the participants to find
more unique threats and mitigations. However, in further the controlled experiment shall
involve more complex issues in domains and allowing the participants do a team work on
identify threats and suggest mitigations. Through this method the experiment cases can be
extend the problem more complexity with larger scope.
The motivation of the participants was also an important issue of the experiment. Even
though their organization was paid to support their future excursion, it was still hard con-
trol their motivation to take in the experiment, specially to ask them to take in experiment
seriously, but if the experiment can be assigned to the participants’ class and ask them to
finish it as a quiz in class. It can probably solve this kind of problems. Yet, with an extra
inducement offered to the participant who can identify most threats might be the best way
to solve this problem too.
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Chapter 13
Experiment - Conclusion and
Future work
13.1 Conclusion
The thesis has reported on a pair of controlled experiment that compared two modeling
approaches for elicitation of security threats. Secure Tropos and Misuse Cases were in-
troduced to the participants at the beginning of each part of the experiment. All the par-
ticipants were sophomore students at IDI, NTNU. The purpose of the experiment was to
introduce two modeling techniques to the participants. They were asked to try to apply
the modeling techniques into the pre-setting cases to see the participants’ perception and
performance of these two modeling techniques. A Latin-Square experimental design was
used to control the tasks and techniques order. The variables were design for investigat-
ing effectiveness of the techniques measured as the number of threats and mitigation they
found, coverage of the techniques were measured in terms of estimating of usage of dia-
grams, textual description and memory, and perceptions of the techniques measured which
using a post-experiment questionnaire based on the Technology Acceptance Model(Davis
1989)[20].
The results indicate that Secure Tropos and Misuse Cases were complementary techniques
having their strengths on pre-requirements analysis and system design analysis aspects.
By comparing with the analytical comparison level of the two modeling techniques, the
experiment results derived that the previous findings cover most results of the experiment.
Therefore, the experiment results can coincide to the previous analytical comparison. The
participants have demonstrated that they prefer to use ST. Due to the results analysis, ST
was a goal based modeling approach; the participant can just through giving high level
suggestions to the threats and mitigation during the analysis of security concerns of a
system. Net Shopping case was indicated that most mitigations were identified when they
have applied ST modeling approach. The explanation of this situation was that NT was
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close to the participants’ daily life.
13.2 Future work
The experiment results enlighten the paths for future work; the first work for the future
empirical study is to use a “standard" template (e.g., boilerplate template) for the partic-
ipants to easily list down their ideas of threats and mitigations. It would be easier for
researchers to evaluate their suggestion. The second work would be a case study to track
the entire system development, through this way to make sure that the combination of ST
and MUC can illustrate the ideas that suggested from this experiment results, and to inves-
tigate whether the complementary combination can significant support the two modeling
techniques to avoid their weakness in order to enhance their strengths together for effective
SR elicitation and modeling. The other possible future works are listed as follows:
• Future work should involve the types of threats and mitigations, through this exper-
iment it was found that the participants’ responses on the threats and mitigations
might be come from their experience. They could suggest several possible and use-
ful methods such as biometric technology in the security analysis of threats and
mitigation. Hence, to give the threats and mitigations a kind of classification could
help researcher to analysis the participants’ performance and other aspects. It also
could help researchers to further improve the modeling techniques themselves.
• The example modeling approach case shall different with the test modeling case.
For example, after the participants read the modeling approaches with the cases, the
testing case shall be different with previous one. The reason why it is need to change
the cases because there were already some identified parts of the systems’ threats in
the experiment, so the participants might only response the identified threats but
no other new threats identified by them even though they suggested mitigations for
those threats. To solve this problem, boilerplate template is a possible way for the
participants to identify threats, the method can avoid the participant have less moti-
vation to finish the experiment and can test whether they understand the modeling
approach or not.
• Training time and group work should be considered for the future experiments. A
short time experiment might not fully express the participants’ behaviors during the
experiment when they work individually. Hence, a training time for the participants
and allow them work in a group would be a solution to measure comprehensively of
their performance in the experiment.
• Comparing Misuse Case and Secure Tropos was only a beginning. Additional ex-
periments involving additional techniques for threat identification should also be
performed in the future. The combination of the two modeling techniques would
be a nice path for comprehensive understanding of the identified threats and mitiga-
tions at the stage of the analysis in a system development, also can prefect practiced
into a real system design stage. The investigation of this kind of work shall be in an
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environment of industry with case study involving real threats analysis during the
requirements phases.
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Chapter 14
Project summary
This chapter contains the evaluation of various aspects of the work done in this project, as
well as the course TDT4506 itself.
14.1 Work process
The project began at autumn semester 2011. It was divided into two main parts, the first
part of the project was initiated by reviewing the basic concepts of i*-based modeling
techniques and use case-based modeling techniques. Meanwhile, a couple of requirements
comparison frameworks by other authors in this academic area were reviewed. Since there
was no analytical comparison of i*-based and Use Case-based modeling initiatives as the
task description mentioned. Thus, the project’s first work was to illustrate the similarities
and complementarily and differences of these techniques.
Secondly, in order to investigate the previous assumption that was presented in the late
first phase of comparative analysis. Two modeling techniques (ST and MUC) were chosen
to design an experiment (ST is i*-based and MUC is use case-based) in the master thesis.
The objective of this experiment was to determine the differences in software engineer’s
modeling performance, experience and their preferences in use of different techniques (ST
and MUC) for specific needs.
At end of the first part of the project, we had a published conference paper on conference
RCIS’12 (see Appendix D). And the second conference paper is still under construction
and will be submitted to a international conference.
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Figure 14.1: Project workload (week)
Figure 14.2: Planned weeks v.s. actually spend weeks for the project
14.2 Workload
The workload of the project was presented in figure 14.1 and 14.2. As the project was long
term project from autumn 2011 to spring 2012, therefore a good time schedule was very
important. The entire project costs ten months, the first four months were used for analyt-
ical comparison of i*-based and Use Case-based modeling initiatives. Since there was the
first time in this academic area to compare Secure Tropos and Misuse Cases together, so
the design of the experiment sheets cost 2 months until the final format of the experiment
sheets were approval.
14.3 Supervisor relations
The supervisors and I had a lot of meetings during the project execution. The following
table shows the meetings for each task of the project execution. Because we also had
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meetings via Skype, so the table is just list the important dates of the project.
Table 14.1: Meeting dates with supervisor and co-supervisors
Meeting date Description People
April 15th, 2011 Kick off the project Y. Pan and P. Karpati
June 7th, 2011 Identify a description of the search and
the identified initiatives.
Y. Pan, P. Karpati and G. Sindre
July 10th, 2011 Preparation of analytical comparison
for 8 modeling techniques.
Y. Pan and P. Karpati
August 29th, 2011 First draft of analytical comparison re-
sults of 8 modeling techniques.
Y. Pan, O. Daramola, P. Karpati
October 15th, 2011 Finally version of comparison results of
the first part project.
Y. Pan, O. Daramola, P. Karpati
December 14th, 2011 Submitting the comparison results. Y. Pan
January 10th, 2012 Confirm the context of the thesis and
sign thesis contract.
Y. Pan and G. Sindre
Feburary 27th, 2012 Approved final version of experiment
sheets.
Y. Pan, O. Daramola
March 13th, 2012 Experiment execution. Y. Pan, O. Daramola, P. Karpati
March 24th, 2012 Discussing data extract rules. Y. Pan and P. Karpati
April 15th, 2012 Confirming the results of the experi-
ment.
Y. Pan and P. Karpati
May 5th, 2012 First thesis draft. Y. Pan and P. Karpati
May 26th, 2012 Second thesis draft. Y. Pan and P. Karpati
June 9th, 2012 Thesis submission. Y. Pan
The supervisors often encouraged me during the project process when I misunderstood
the concepts or sometimes the academic writing problems. They also provided valuable
feedback on the work process, such as the analytical study and the experiment design;
the communications between us were very nice, their academic spirits encouraging and
enlightening for my future research work.
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Introduction to the experiment 
Thank you for your participation! In this experiment, you will learn about two 
different security modelling techniques, read two different scenarios illustrated 
by either of the modelling techniques and answer questions. 
Estimated schedule in minutes: 
1. Pre-experiment questionnaire: 5 minutes 
2. Reading the introduction to the experiment: 5 minutes 
a) Introduction to Secure Tropos (ST)/Misuse Use Cases (MUC) modelling 
technique: 8 minutes. 
b) Reading Net Shopping/ (Health Insurance System) case description and 
diagrams together: 20 minutes. 
c) Find threats and mitigations for Secure Tropos/Misuse Case:  10 minutes. 
d) Estimating the usage percentage of textual description and diagram:5 
minutes 
e) Post-experiment questionnaire: 5 minutes  
f) Break 5 minutes 
g) Introduction to Misuse Case (MUC)/Secure Tropos (ST) modelling 
technique:  8 minutes. 
h) Reading Health Insurance System/Net Shopping case description and 
diagrams together: 20 minutes. 
i) Find threats and mitigation: 10 minutes 
j) Estimating the usage percentage of textual description and diagram:5 
minutes 
k) Post-experiment questionnaire: 5 minutes  
Pre-experiment questionnaire (5 minutes) 
Please give an anonymous identifier which you will remember: _______ 
Please circle the number which you consider most fit. 
 
Please indicate the following data: 
1. Number of completed semesters of study after high school: ________ 
2. Number of months of study-related working experience, including summer 
jobs:__ 
  (Re-calculated of full time, e.g., a 10 month 20% part job should be report as 
2 month)  
 
Never 
heard 
about it 
Read 
about 
it 
Tried 
it out  
Used it 
a lot  
Expert 
System 
modelling 
1 2 3 4 5 
UML use 
case 
diagram 
1 2 3 4 5 
Misuse 
case 
diagram 
1 2 3 4 5 
UML 
activity 
diagrams 
1 2 3 4 5 
Mal-
activity 
diagrams 
1 2 3 4 5 
Secure 
Tropos 
diagrams 
1 2 3 4 5 
i* 
modelling 
diagrams 
1 2 3 4 5 
Introduction to Secure Tropos Modelling (8 minutes) 
1. What is Secure Tropos? 
Secure Tropos is a security-oriented extension of the Tropos methodology. 
Tropos is an agent-oriented software engineering methodology. Secure Tropos 
is used for analysing the security needs of the stakeholders and the system. It 
shows the security constraints imposed on the stakeholders and the system, 
identifies secure entities that guarantee the satisfaction of the security 
constraints, and assigns capabilities to the system to help towards the 
satisfaction of the secure entities. 
The key concepts of the Tropos, includes the following:  
1) Security constraint: This is defined as a restriction related to security 
issues, such as privacy, integrity and availability.  
2) Secure goal: This represents the strategic interests of an actor with respect 
to security.  
3) Secure plan: This is defined as a plan that represents a particular way for 
satisfying a secure goal.  
4) Secure dependency: This introduces security constraint(s) that must be 
fulfilled for the dependency to be satisfied. 
2. Notations used in Secure Tropos Diagram. 
Figure 1 shows the Tropos and Secure Tropos notation and some Tropos 
concepts graphically. 
Actor: entities that have strategic goals and intentionality. 
Goal: an actor's strategic interests. 
Soft-goals: goals without clear criteria whether they are satisfied or not. 
Task: represents at an abstract level, a way of doing something. 
Resource: represents a physical or information entity. 
Dependencies: indicate that one actor depends on another in order to attain 
some goals, execute some tasks, or deliver a resource. 
 
Figure 1: Tropos, Secure Tropos notation and Tropos concepts graphically 
3. Example of Secure Tropos Diagram 
Figure 2 shows the full dependency link with a security constraint. Customer 
requires DVD from the DVD store. Both customer and DVD store are actors in 
this case. Watch movie is a secure goal. Customer is a depender with 
constraints to the dependee DVD store. DVD store has the responsibility to 
keep the customer's personal information private and just could share the 
information only when consent is available. 
   
Figure 2  Full dependency links with a security constraint 
 
  
Net Shopping (20 minutes) 
The most known traditional way is that we browse goods, compare the goods 
provided by different salespersons, and decide to buy it, pay for it and wait for 
its delivery. Another way to buy stuff via the Internet is "trust rating". In trust 
rating, we pay the fees to pay-pal first, when we receive the goods, we check 
and use it within 3 days to ensure we are comfortable with the goods then we 
can confirm the deal with pay-pal to finish this transaction, pay-pal pays 
money to the seller after we confirm the deal. 
"Trust rating" is a transaction for the salesperson. Each successful transaction 
allows buyers to mark a credit evaluation for it. Evaluation is divided into 
positive, neutral, and negative feedback categories. Each credit is equal to a 
credit score. After each transaction, if there is a good evaluation for the 
salesperson, they will get one point. No point for medium evaluation, one point 
is deducted from a salesperson for a negative evaluation. If a salesperson has 
no medium and negative evaluations within 300 continuous transactions, he 
will get a diamond to illustrate the high trust rating. The more diamonds he has, 
the higher the good quality and trust during the transaction. In this case there 
are three important vulnerabilities: 
1. How to avoid salespersons selling goods to themselves in order to earn more    
diamonds. 
2. The salespersons could sell the virtual products (e.g. illegal scanned eBook) 
in a very low price to their partners (themselves or other salespersons), after 
they get the diamonds, they may sell other real products (e.g. print copy of a 
real book). 
3. Some third party platforms may help salespersons to get diamonds in a 
dubious way, such that all the sold goods are later refunded to the seller but 
they will get a fee after the transaction (when the salesperson has already 
earned the diamond). 
Secure Tropos diagram for Net Shopping 
Figure 3 illustrates Secure Tropos diagrams for Net Shopping. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Secure Tropos diagrams for Net Shopping 
 
 
Health Insurance System (20 minutes) 
An application that runs on the Microsoft and Android Mobile platform could 
be used to collect an older person's health data everyday which includes heart 
beat rates, carbon dioxide in blood, body temperature, and blood pressure. 
All of the data from an older person could be sent at once or one at a time to 
the Health Insurance Department (HID) server in the hospital. The most 
important and delicate matters for the health insurance department is the 
privacy of all older person's medical information and the sharing of it. When 
HID receives the data, a doctor analyses the data and gives a feedback, the 
feedback is sent to the older person by a system, and also a copy is sent to HID.  
When HID receives the feedback form from the doctor, they will calculate fees 
and update the health insurance database in the hospital, then check the 
database of the status of older person's health insurance, to figure out whether 
the medical health fee is now above 1800NOK or not. According to the welfare 
and security system in Norway, if the medical health fee is above 1800NOK 
the older person will not need to pay the bills in a normal year rather, HID will 
request bank to send the bills to the insurance company, otherwise, HID will 
request bank to send bills to the older person that should be paid in a normal 
year. 
When bank receives the message from the HID, they will create bills according 
to the messages received from HID, and send bills to the older person or 
insurance company. We are only concerned with the way the older person and 
insurance company pay the bills via Internet. Bank should guarantee that there 
is a secure interaction between the users and bank system. 
Secure Tropos diagram for Health Insurance System 
Figure 4 illustrates the Secure Tropos diagrams for Health Insurance System. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Overview of Health Insurance System
Threats and Mitigation (10 minutes) 
Please list here as many potential threat(s) as you can after reading. Try to 
come up with mitigation for the threat(s) you find (in English), several possible 
mitigation can be suggested for one threat. 
Threat  Mitigation    
1. 1.1 
1.2 
... 
 
 
 
Estimating the usage percentage of textual description and diagram (5 
minutes) 
1) Please give an estimate, to what extent did you use: 
a)  The Secure Tropos diagrams to identify threats? _____% 
b)  The textual description of the scenario to identify threats? ____% 
c)  Only memory to identify threats?  ____%                                                                         
   The sum of the percentages should be 100%.     Sum: 100%                                                  
2) Please give an estimate, to what extent did you use  
a) The Secure Tropos diagrams to find ideas for mitigations?  ___%                                             
b) The textual description of the scenario to identify mitigations?  ___%                        
c) Only threats identified earlier to find ideas for mitigations? ____%                  
d) Only memory to find ideas for mitigations?  _____%                                                      
   The sum of the percentages should be 100%.  Sum: 100% 
  
Post-experiment questionnaire for Secure Tropos (5 minutes) 
Please fill in the number from 1-5 in front of each raw in the table which you 
feel most fit. "1" stands for strongly agree while "5" stands for strongly 
disagree. 
 
Strong 
Agree 
Agree Neutral  Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The textual description 
combined with the Secure 
Tropos diagram gave me a 
better understanding of the 
Secure Tropos than I would 
have gotten from the text 
alone.   
1 2 3 4 5 
If working as a freelance 
consultant for a customer 
who needs help, I would 
use Secure Tropos diagram 
to identify security 
concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I found it easy to interpret 
the Secure Tropos diagram. 
1 2 3 4 5 
If I need to analyse a 
complex scenario, I would 
consider using Secure 
Tropos diagram. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Secure Tropos diagram 
would be useless in finding 
system security issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 
If I need to explain some 
security scenarios to my 
colleagues, I would 
consider using Secure 
Tropos diagram. 
1 2 3 4 5 
It would be easy to draw a 
Secure Tropos diagram 
based on a similar case 
description like in the 
experiment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Secure Tropos diagram 
caused me to waste time on 
threats of minor importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
The connection between the 
Secure Tropos diagram and 
the textual description of 
the securities were 
confusing. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Secure Tropos diagram 
made me more productive 
in recognizing threats and 
finding security issues for 
the case.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Secure Tropos diagram 
could be a great help to 
discuss preventions for 
security scenarios with 
colleagues. 
1 2 3 4 5 
It would be easy to get used 
to the notation of Secure 
Tropos diagram. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction to Misuse Case Modelling (8 minutes) 
1. What is Misuse Case? 
Misuse Case is an extension of Use Case where it is possible to model not only 
the normal functionality wanted in the system, but also negative functionality 
that is not wanted, with the purpose of addressing security concerns. In 
addition to normal use cases and normal actors, there would be malicious 
actors performing Misuse Case that cause harm to the system. 
2. How to define the Misuse Case and Misuser? 
We define Misuse Case and Misuser as follows: 
Misuse Case: A sequence of actions, including variants, that a system or other 
entity can perform, interacting with Misusers of the entity and causing harm to 
some stakeholder if the sequence is allowed to complete. 
Misuser: An actor that initiates Misuse Case, either intentionally or 
inadvertently. 
3. What are the notations used in Misuse Case Diagram? 
Compared to regular Use Cases, the inverted notation indicates both: similarity 
(because the same symbol shapes are used) and negation (because of the 
inverted graphics). Use Case and Misuse Case can, therefore, be shown in the 
same diagram without confusion.  
Ordinary Use Case relationships such as include, extend, and generalize can be 
used between Misuse Case too, and ordinary association relationships can be 
used between Misuser and their Misuse Case. Misuse Case also can threaten a 
Use Case when the Use Case is threatened by the "obtain info on marketing 
plans" Misuse Case. 
Notation of Misuse Case diagram: 
 
Figure 5 The notation of MUC 
4. Example of Misuse Case diagram 
Figure 6 uses inverted graphics to show Misuse Case together with regular Use 
Case in a high-level specification of part of Health Insurance System. 
 
Figure 6 Threats of Health Insurance System 
Net Shopping (20 minutes) 
The most known traditional way is that we browse goods, compare the goods 
provided by different salespersons, and decide to buy it, pay for it and wait for 
its delivery. Another way to buy stuff via the Internet is "trust rating". In trust 
rating, we pay the fees to pay-pal first, when we receive the goods, we check 
and use it within 3 days to ensure we are comfortable with the goods then we 
can confirm the deal with pay-pal to finish this transaction, pay-pal pays 
money to the seller after we confirm the deal. 
"Trust rating" is a transaction for the salesperson. Each successful transaction 
allows buyers to mark a credit evaluation for it. Evaluation is divided into 
positive, neutral, and negative feedback categories. Each credit is equal to a 
credit score. After each transaction, if there is a good evaluation for the 
salesperson, they will get one point. No point for medium evaluation, one point 
is deducted from a salesperson for a negative evaluation. If a salesperson has 
no medium and negative evaluations within 300 continuous transactions, he 
will get a diamond to illustrate the high trust rating. The more diamonds he has, 
the higher the good quality and trust during the transaction. In this case there 
are three important vulnerabilities: 
1. How to avoid salespersons selling goods to themselves in order to earn more    
diamonds. 
2. The salespersons could sell the virtual products (e.g. illegal scanned eBook) 
in a very low price to their partners (themselves or other salespersons), after 
they get the diamonds, they may sell other real products (e.g. print copy of a 
real book). 
3. Some third party platforms may help salespersons to get diamonds in a 
dubious way, such that all the sold goods are later refunded to the seller but 
they will get a fee after the transaction (when the salesperson has already 
earned the diamond). 
Misuse Case diagrams for Net shopping case 
Figure 7: shows salesperson pretends as a buyer and sales goods to himself or 
herself. 
 
Figure 7 Salesperson pretends as a buyer 
Figure 8 shows some third parties pretend as a buyer to buy goods to help 
salesperson to get more diamonds. 
 Figure 8 Third parties pretends as a buyer 
Figure 9 shows how attacker can pretend as a system trade monitor to allow the 
virtual products transaction. 
 
Figure 9 Attacker allows the virtual products trade. 
  
Health Insurance System (20 minutes) 
An application that runs on the Microsoft and Android Mobile platform could 
be used to collect an older person's health data everyday which includes heart 
beat rates, carbon dioxide in blood, body temperature, and blood pressure. 
All of the data from an older person could be sent at once or one at a time to 
the Health Insurance Department (HID) server in the hospital. The most 
important and delicate matters for the health insurance department is the 
privacy of all older person's medical information and the sharing of it. When 
HID receives the data, a doctor analyses the data and gives a feedback, the 
feedback is sent to the older person by a system, and also a copy is sent to HID.  
When HID receives the feedback form from the doctor, they will calculate fees 
and update the health insurance database in the hospital, then check the 
database of the status of older person's health insurance, to figure out whether 
the medical health fee is now above 1800NOK or not. According to the welfare 
and security system in Norway, if the medical health fee is above 1800NOK 
the older person will not need to pay the bills in a normal year rather, HID will 
request bank to send the bills to the insurance company, otherwise, HID will 
request bank to send bills to the older person that should be paid in a normal 
year. 
When bank receives the message from the HID, they will create bills according 
to the messages received from HID, and send bills to the older person or 
insurance company. We are only concerned with the way the older person and 
insurance company pay the bills via Internet. Bank should guarantee that there 
is a secure interaction between the users and bank system. 
Misuse Case diagrams for Health Insurance System 
Figure 10 and 11 are the examples of Health Insurance System's vulnerabilities. 
Figure 10: Attacker can get the password and send the data package to DHI 
server without notice by older persons. 
 
 
Figure 10 Attacker illegally get the password and send data to DHI 
Figure 11 shows attacker modifies the database after he/she attacked the 
system. 
 
Figure 11 Attacker modifies the database after he/she attacked the system 
Figure 12 shows attacker gets the password of the insurance company. 
 
Figure 12 Attacker gets the password of the insurance company system 
Figure 13 shows the attacker get the password of the bank system and login 
illegally. He can create fake bills and collect the payments through his own 
account.  
 
Figure 13 Attacker get the password of bank system and create fake bills, 
collect payments by his own account. 
  
Threats and Mitigation (10 minutes) 
Please list here as many potential threat(s) as you can after reading. Try to 
come up with mitigation for the threat(s) you find (in English), several possible 
mitigation can be suggested for one threat. 
Threat  Mitigation    
1. 1.1 
1.2 
... 
 
 
Estimating the usage percentage of textual description and diagram (5 
minutes) 
1) Please give an estimate, to what extent did you use: 
a)  The Misuse Case diagrams to identify threats? _____% 
b)  The textual description of the scenario to identify threats? ____% 
c)  Only memory to identify threats?  ____%                                                                         
   The sum of the percentages should be 100%.     Sum: 100%                                                  
2) Please give an estimate, to what extent did you use  
a) The Misuse Case diagrams to find ideas for mitigations?  ___%                                             
b) The textual description of the scenario to identify mitigations?  ___%                        
c) Only threats identified earlier to find ideas for mitigations? ____%                  
d) Only memory to find ideas for mitigations?  _____%                                                      
   The sum of the percentages should be 100%.  Sum: 100% 
 
 
Post-experiment questionnaire for Misuse Case (5 minutes) 
Please fill in the number from 1-5 in front of each raw in the table which you feel most 
fit. "1" stands for strongly agree while "5" stands for strongly disagree. 
 
Strong 
Agree 
Agree Neutral  Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The textual description combined 
with the Misuse Case diagram gave 
me a better understanding of the 
Misuse Case than I would have 
gotten from the text alone.   
1 2 3 4 5 
If working as a freelance consultant 
for a customer who needs help, I 
would use Misuse Case diagram to 
identify security concerns. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I found it easy to interpret the 
Misuse Case diagram. 
1 2 3 4 5 
If I need to analyse a complex 
scenario, I would consider using 
Misuse Case diagram. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Misuse Case diagram would be 
useless in finding system security 
issues. 
1 2 3 4 5 
If I need to explain some security 
scenarios to my colleagues, I would 
consider using Misuse Case 
diagram. 
1 2 3 4 5 
It would be easy to draw a Misuse 
Case diagram based on a similar 
case description like in the 
experiment. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Misuse Case diagram caused me to 
waste time on threats of minor 
1 2 3 4 5 
importance 
The connection between the Misuse 
Case diagram and the textual 
description of the securities were 
confusing. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Misuse Case diagram made me 
more productive in recognizing 
threats and finding security issues 
for the case.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Misuse Case diagram could be a 
great help to discuss preventions for 
security scenarios with colleagues. 
1 2 3 4 5 
It would be easy to get used to the 
notation of Misuse Case diagram. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Experiment Data 
1. Pre-questionnaire 
Pre-questionniare Never heard about it  = 1, Read about it  = 2, Tried it  out = 3, Used it  a lot = 4, Expert = 5
Seq. ID Student IDSystem modellinL use case diagiuse case diagraL activity diagr-activity diagre Tropos diag modelling diagr Semesters Jobs
1 winniuile 2 3 2 2 1 1 3 1.5
2 88 2 3 1 3 1 1 1 4 0
3 MJ14 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 7 0
4 VON 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 0
5 G2K 2 4 1 2 1 1 1 3 0
6 H33 1 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 0
7 202 3 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 0
8 JB24 2 3 2 3 1 1 1 3 0
9 6 3 3 2 4 2 1 1 3 0
10 1114k 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 5 0
11 tru 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 2
12 -~!!$ 4 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 2
13 orange 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 5 1
1 248357 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 3 2
2 ``````` 3 3 1 3 1 1 2 3 1
3 i1648 3 3 1 3 1 1 1 7 0
4 3 3 2 2 1 1 2 3 0
5 SH 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 0
6 123 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 0
7 MHH 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 0
8 he 3 4 1 2 1 1 1 3 0
9 APE123 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 0
10 Trallala 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 0
11 test 3 4 1 2 1 1 2 3 3
1 45 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 0
2 AK 3 4 1 3 1 1 1 3 0
3 hdr 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 0
4 bo 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 0
5 294 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 3 0
6 4747 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 0
7 pfhoy 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 0
8 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 0
9 725 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 0
10 1024 3 3 2 2 1 1 3 3 2
11 1247 3 4 1 2 1 1 1 3
12 #10 2 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 1
13 C9A1 3 3 1 3 1 1 1 2 1
1 333 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 9 2
2 1105 3 3 1 2 1 1 3 3 2
3 47900 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 0
4 A.N 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 3 0
5 vena 3 4 1 2 2 1 1 3 0
6 67 3 3 1 3 1 1 1 3 0
7 3647 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 0
8 HMO 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 0
9 lowe 3 3 1 2 1 1 3 3 0
10 T 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 0
11 1106 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 3 1
12 8526 3 3 1 2 1 1 1 3 5
13 CYI 3 3 2 3 1 1 1 3 7
 
2. Post-questionnaire –Secure Tropos  
Secure Tropos ST_PU 1 ST_PU2 ST_PU3 ST_PU4 T_Average PU ST_ITU 1 ST_ITU2 ST_ITU3 ST_ITU4 _AVERAGE ITST_PEOU1 ST_PEOU2 ST_PEOU3 ST_PEOU4 AVERAGE PE
Group 1 <1> 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 3 2.75 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 4 2 3 2.75 4 3 4 4 3.75 4 3 3 4 3.5
3 3 3 4 2 3 5 2 5 5 4.25 5 5 5 4 4.75
4 1 5 2 3 2.75 2 2 1 2 1.75 3 2 2 2 2.25
5 4 3 3 4 3.5 4 4 4 2 3.5 4 2 4 4 3.5
6 2 4 3 2 2.75 4 3 2 2 2.75 4 4 4 3 3.75
7 2 4 2 2 2.5 3 3 3 2 2.75 4 2 3 2 2.75
8 3 4 2 2 2.75 3 3 2 2 2.5 4 4 3 2 3.25
9 1 5 3 1 2.5 2 2 3 2 2.25 2 3 3 1 2.25
10 1 3 3 2 2.25 2 3 4 2 2.75 2 4 3 2 2.75
11 2 4 2 2 2.5 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 2.5
12 5 3 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4.25
13 2 4 1 2 2.25 4 2 2 4 3 3 3 3 2 2.75
Group <2>1 1 3 3 5 3 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 3 3 2.5
2 1 4 3 4 3 1 4 2 2 2.25 2 2 2 2 2
3 1 4 3 4 3 3 4 3 2 3 1 2 3 3 2.25
4 2 3 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2.25 2 2 4 3 2.75
5 2 4 4 4 3.5 3 3 3 4 3.25 2 3 2 3 2.5
6 2 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 2 2.25 2 3 3 3 2.75
7 1 4 4 5 3.5 3 3 4 2 3 2 3 2 3 2.5
8 1 4 3 5 3.25 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 3 2 2.75
9 2 4 4 4 3.5 3 3 2 2 2.5 2 2 3 2 2.25
10 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3.5
11 1 3 4 4 3 2 3 3 3 2.75 3 2 4 3 3
Group <3> 1 3 4 3 2 3 3 4 3 4 3.5 3 4 4 3 3.5
2 2 3 3 2 2.5 4 4 4 3 3.75 4 4 3 3 3.5
3 3 4 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 3.5 4 4 4 4 4
4 4 3 3 2 3 4 4 4 2 3.5 3 3 4 4 3.5
5 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 2.75
6 2 4 3 4 3.25 3 3 4 4 3.5 4 4 3 3 3.5
7 3 4 4 3 3.5 4 5 5 3 4.25 4 4 4 4 4
8 1 5 5 4 3.75 1 2 2 1 1.5 2 2 2 2 2
9 2 4 4 4 3.5 3 3 2 2 2.5 3 3 3 3 3
10 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 2 4 3 3 2 3 2 2.5
11 4 3 3 4 3.5 4 4 4 2 3.5 2 2 3 4 2.75
12 2 5 3 4 3.5 2 2 3 4 2.75 4 4 2 1 2.75
13 2 4 4 4 3.5 3 3 4 3 3.25 3 3 3 3 3
Group <4> 1 2 5 3 1 2.75 3 2 2 2 2.25 3 3 2 2 2.5
2 1 4 2 2 2.25 4 2 3 2 2.75 3 2 3 2 2.5
3 2 4 2 2 2.5 3 2 3 2 2.5 3 2 3 2 2.5
4 4 2 5 4 3.75 5 5 5 3 4.5 5 5 5 5 5
5 4 3 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 3.75 3 2 4 4 3.25
6 3 3 4 3 3.25 4 4 4 3 3.75 4 4 3 4 3.75
7 2 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 4 3.75 3 3 2 3 2.75
8 2 3 2 2 2.25 2 1 2 3 2 3 2 2 2 2.25
9 2 3 5 4 3.5 5 4 4 3 4 4 5 5 3 4.25
10 2 4 4 5 3.75 3 4 3 4 3.5 4 4 4 3 3.75
11 1 2 4 4 2.75 4 4 5 3 4 3 4 4 3 3.5
12 2 4 4 2 3 4 4 4 2 3.5 3 4 3 4 3.5
13 2 4 2 2 2.5 3 4 3 2 3 3 2 3 2 2.5
 
3. Post-questionnaire –Misuse Case 
Misuse Cases MUC_PU 1 MUC_PU2 MUC_PU3 MUC_PU4 UC_Average PMUC_ITU 1 MUC_ITU2 MUC_ITU3 MUC_ITU4 C_AVERAGE MUC_PEOU1MUC_PEOU2MUC_PEOU3MUC_PEOU4UC_AVERAG  
Group 1 <1> 1 4 2 3 2.5 2 3 2 2 2.25 2 2 3 2 2.25
2 2 4 2 2 2.5 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 3 4 2.75
3 1 5 1 2 2.25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
4 1 5 2 1 2.25 2 4 2 2 2.5 1 1 1 2 1.25
5 1 4 3 2 2.5 1 2 2 1 1.5 1 1 2 1 1.25
6 2 4 2 2 2.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2.25
7 2 4 2 3 2.75 1 2 1 1 1.25 1 3 2 2 2
8 2 5 1 3 2.75 2 4 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2.25
9 1 4 3 2 2.5 2 3 2 2 2.25 2 2 1 4 2.25
10 1 3 3 3 2.5 2 3 2 4 2.75 1 1 2 2 1.5
11 1 4 1 1 1.75 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 1.5
12 2 4 3 2 2.75 2 2 3 2 2.25 1 2 3 3 2.25
13 4 3 1 2 2.5 5 4 4 2 3.75 3 2 3 4 3
Group <2>1 1 4 2 1 2 1 1 3 2 1.75 1 2 2 3 2
2 1 4 3 2 2.5 4 4 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2
3 1 4 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1.5
4 1 5 2 2 2.5 2 2 2 1 1.75 1 2 3 2 2
5 1 4 2 2 2.25 2 2 2 1 1.75 2 2 2 2 2
6 2 2 3 2 2.25 2 2 3 1 2 1 2 4 4 2.75
7 2 3 3 3 2.75 4 4 4 2 3.5 4 2 4 4 3.5
8 2 4 3 2 2.75 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2.75
9 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2.25
10 2 3 2 2 2.25 3 3 3 2 2.75 3 2 2 2 2.25
11 3 4 2 1 2.5 2 2 3 2 2.25 1 2 2 2 1.75
Group <3> 1 2 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 1 2
2 4 3 3 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 2 2
3 2 4 3 1 2.5 2 4 2 2 2.5 2 3 3 2 2.5
4 1 2 3 2 2 3 2 2 2 2.25 2 2 4 3 2.75
5 2 3 3 3 2.75 3 3 2 3 2.75 3 3 4 3 3.25
6 1 4 3 3 2.75 2 3 2 2 2.25 3 3 2 2 2.5
7 3 4 1 1 2.25 3 2 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 1.75
8 1 4 2 2 2.25 3 3 3 1 2.5 2 3 3 3 2.75
9 1 3 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2.25 2 2 3 3 2.5
10 3 4 3 3 3.25 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2.75
11 2 4 3 2 2.75 3 2 2 2 2.25 2 2 3 3 2.5
12 2 4 3 4 3.25 2 2 2 1 1.75 1 2 3 3 2.25
13 4 4 3 4 3.75 3 3 4 2 3 4 2 3 3 3
Group <4> 1 1 5 2 2 2.5 2 1 2 1 1.5 1 1 1 1 1
2 1 4 2 2 2.25 3 2 3 2 2.5 2 2 4 2 2.5
3 2 4 3 1 2.5 2 2 2 1 1.75 1 2 3 2 2
4 1 4 3 2 2.5 2 3 3 2 2.5 2 3 2 2 2.25
5 1 4 3 2 2.5 2 2 2 2 2 1 3 3 2 2.25
6 2 4 2 2 2.5 3 2 3 2 2.5 2 2 3 3 2.5
7 1 4 2 2 2.25 2 2 1 1 1.5 2 2 2 1 1.75
8 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1.75 1 2 2 1 1.5
9 1 5 2 2 2.5 2 3 2 1 2 1 3 2 1 1.75
10 1 5 2 2 2.5 1 2 2 1 1.5 2 2 3 2 2.25
11 1 4 3 1 2.25 2 2 3 2 2.25 2 2 2 3 2.25
12 2 4 3 2 2.75 3 2 2 2 2.25 2 3 3 2 2.5
13 1 4 3 3 2.75 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1.75
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Appendix C – Analysed Data 
1. Results of Kruskal-Wallis H tests - four independent groups background 
variables. 
Knowledgeable about 7 modelling approaches (pre-questionnaire) 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: System modelling versus Group 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on System modelling 
Group     N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        13   2,000      20,0  -1,59 
2        11   3,000      31,4   1,52 
3        13   3,000      24,0  -0,43 
4        13   3,000      27,5   0,59 
Overall  50              25,5 
H = 4,08  DF = 3  P = 0,253 
H = 5,69  DF = 3  P = 0,128  (adjusted for ties) 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: UML use case diagram versus Group  
Kruskal-Wallis Test on UML use case diagram 
Group     N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        13   3,000      24,8  -0,19 
2        11   3,000      29,5   1,04 
3        13   3,000      23,4  -0,61 
4        13   3,000      24,8  -0,19 
Overall  50              25,5 
H = 1,17  DF = 3  P = 0,759 
H = 2,63  DF = 3  P = 0,452  (adjusted for ties) 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Miuse case diagram versus Group  
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Miuse case diagram 
Group     N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        13   1,000      27,7   0,63 
2        11   1,000      22,3  -0,83 
3        13   1,000      23,8  -0,48 
4        13   1,000      27,7   0,63 
Overall  50              25,5 
H = 1,29  DF = 3  P = 0,730 
H = 2,51  DF = 3  P = 0,473  (adjusted for ties) 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: UML activity diagrams versus Group  
Kruskal-Wallis Test on UML activity diagrams 
Group     N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        13   2,000      31,2   1,65 
2        11   2,000      22,2  -0,84 
3        13   2,000      21,3  -1,19 
4        13   2,000      26,7   0,34 
Overall  50              25,5 
H = 3,71  DF = 3  P = 0,295 
H = 4,18  DF = 3  P = 0,243  (adjusted for ties) 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Mal-activity diagrams versus Group  
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Mal-activity diagrams 
Group     N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        13   1,000      25,9   0,12 
2        11   1,000      24,0  -0,39 
3        13   1,000      25,9   0,12 
4        13   1,000      25,9   0,12 
Overall  50              25,5 
H = 0,15  DF = 3  P = 0,985 
H = 0,88  DF = 3  P = 0,830  (adjusted for ties) 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Secure Tropos diagrams versus Group  
49 cases were used 
1 cases contained missing values 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Secure Tropos diagrams 
Group     N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        12   1,000      24,5  -0,14 
2        11   1,000      24,5  -0,13 
3        13   1,000      26,4   0,41 
4        13   1,000      24,5  -0,15 
Overall  49              25,0 
H = 0,17  DF = 3  P = 0,983 
H = 2,77  DF = 3  P = 0,429  (adjusted for ties) 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: i* modelling diagrams versus Group  
Kruskal-Wallis Test on i* modelling diagrams 
Group     N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        13   1,000      22,0  -1,01 
2        11   1,000      28,4   0,75 
3        13   1,000      25,9   0,11 
4        13   1,000      26,2   0,19 
Overall  50              25,5 
H = 1,22  DF = 3  P = 0,748 
H = 3,36  DF = 3  P = 0,339  (adjusted for ties) 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Semesters versus Group  
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Semesters 
Group     N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        13   3,000      29,2   1,06 
2        11   3,000      26,2   0,19 
3        13   3,000      20,7  -1,38 
4        13   3,000      26,0   0,14 
Overall  50              25,5 
H = 2,29  DF = 3  P = 0,514 
H = 5,11  DF = 3  P = 0,164  (adjusted for ties) 
Test the work experience of the groups. 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Jobs versus Group  
47 cases were used 
3 cases contained missing values 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Jobs 
Group     N       Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        13  0,000000000      24,7   0,23 
2        11  0,000000000      24,3   0,09 
3        12  0,000000000      22,9  -0,32 
4        11  0,000000000      24,0   0,00 
Overall  47                   24,0 
H = 0,12  DF = 3  P = 0,990 
H = 0,19  DF = 3  P = 0,979  (adjusted for ties) 
 
Comparison of paired modelling approach  
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff UseCase v.s. i* modelling  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                    N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                                 N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff UseCase v.s. i* modelling  50     46     1081.0  0.000      2.000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff. MUC v.s. ST  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                           N for   Wilcoxon           Estimated 
                    N  N*   Test  Statistic      P       Median 
Diff. MUC v.s. ST  49   1      9       45.0  0.009  0.000000000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff Activity v.s. Mal-activity  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                     N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                                  N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff Activity v.s. Mal-activity  50     34      595.0  0.000      1.000 
 
2. Performance  
Compare the number of identified threats and mitigations for the two modelling 
approaches.  
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff THR(ST) V.S. THR(MUC)  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                             N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff THR(ST) V.S. THR(MUC)  50     36      231.5  0.113    -0.5000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT(ST) V.S. MIT(MUC)  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                             N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff MIT(ST) V.S. MIT(MUC)  50     40      200.0  0.005    -0.5000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff THMI(ST) V.S. THMI(MUC)  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                  N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff THMI(ST) V.S. THMI(MUC)  50     39      184.0  0.004     -1.000 
Compare the number of identified threats and mitigation between the first modelling 
technique with the second modelling technique.  
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff First v.s. Second (THR)  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                  N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff First v.s. Second (THR)  50     36      446.5  0.076     0.5000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff First v.s. Second (MIT)  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                  N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff First v.s. Second (MIT)  50     40      593.0  0.014     0.5000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff First v.s. Second (THMI)  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                   N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                                N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff First v.s. Second (THMI)  50     39      572.5  0.011      1.000 
 
3. Estimated use of diagrams, textual description and memory  
Descriptive Statistics: THR_DIAG(ST)  
Variable       N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum    Q1  Median     Q3 
THR_DIAG(ST)  50   0  29.00     3.69  26.07     0.00  8.75   25.00  42.50 
Variable      Maximum 
THR_DIAG(ST)   100.00 
Descriptive Statistics: MIT_DIAG(ST)  
Variable       N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum    Q1  Median     Q3 
MIT_DIAG(ST)  50   0  20.70     3.44  24.33     0.00  0.00   10.00  30.00 
Variable      Maximum 
MIT_DIAG(ST)   100.00 
Descriptive Statistics: THR_DIAG (MUC)  
Variable         N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum     Q1  Median     Q3 
THR_DIAG (MUC)  50   0  44.54     3.86  27.27     0.00  20.00   50.00  70.00 
Variable        Maximum 
THR_DIAG (MUC)    90.00 
Descriptive Statistics: MIT_DIAG (MUC)  
Variable         N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum    Q1  Median     Q3 
MIT_DIAG (MUC)  49   1  19.23     2.75  19.24     0.00  1.25   15.00  30.00 
Variable        Maximum 
MIT_DIAG (MUC)    80.00 
Compare the different between using THR and MIT with relevant methods (diagrams, 
textual description and memory) to identify threats and mitigation. 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff THR_TXT ST v.s. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                              N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                           N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff THR_TXT ST v.s. MUC  50     45      816.5  0.001      15.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff THR_MEM ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                              N for   Wilcoxon           Estimated 
                           N   Test  Statistic      P       Median 
Diff THR_MEM ST V.S. MUC  50     38      372.0  0.988  0.000000000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_MEM ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                  N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                           N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff MIT_MEM ST V.S. MUC  49   1     37      202.5  0.025     -5.000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_VUL ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                  N for   Wilcoxon           Estimated 
                           N  N*   Test  Statistic      P       Median 
Diff MIT_VUL ST V.S. MUC  49   1     35      302.5  0.844  0.000000000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_TXT ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                  N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                           N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff MIT_TXT ST V.S. MUC  49   1     34      444.0  0.013      7.500 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff THR_DIAG (ST V.S. MUC)  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                 N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                              N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff THR_DIAG (ST V.S. MUC)  50     47      284.5  0.003     -15.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_DIAG (ST V.S. MUC)  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                     N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                              N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff MIT_DIAG (ST V.S. MUC)  49   1     40      375.0  0.643     -2.500 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: THR_DIAG Diff NS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
THR_DIAG Diff NS ST V.S. MUC  24   2     21       54.5  0.035     -15.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: THR_DIAG Diff HIS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                       N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                                N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
THR_DIAG Diff HIS ST V.S. MUC  24   2     21       62.0  0.065     -15.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: THR_TXT Diff NS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                     N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                              N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
THR_TXT Diff NS ST V.S. MUC  24   2     21      172.5  0.050      15.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: THR_TXT Diff HIS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
THR_TXT Diff HIS ST V.S. MUC  24   2     23      222.0  0.011      17.50 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: THR_MEM NS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                N for   Wilcoxon           Estimated 
                         N  N*   Test  Statistic      P       Median 
THR_MEM NS ST V.S. MUC  24   2     22      128.5  0.961  0.000000000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: THR_MEM HIS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                 N for   Wilcoxon           Estimated 
                          N  N*   Test  Statistic      P       Median 
THR_MEM HIS ST V.S. MUC  24   2     21      114.5  0.986  0.000000000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: MIT_DIAG NS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                 N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                          N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
MIT_DIAG NS ST V.S. MUC  23   3     19      108.5  0.601      2.500 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: MIT_DIAG Diff HIS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                       N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                                N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
MIT_DIAG Diff HIS ST V.S. MUC  24   2     22      110.5  0.615     -5.000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: MIT_TXT Diff NS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                     N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                              N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
MIT_TXT Diff NS ST V.S. MUC  23   3     22      155.0  0.363      5.000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: MIT_TXT Diff HIS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
MIT_TXT Diff HIS ST V.S. MUC  24   2     20      153.0  0.076      7.500 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: MIT_THR NS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                         N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
MIT_THR NS ST V.S. MUC  23   3     21       68.0  0.102     -10.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: MIT_THR HIS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                 N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                          N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
MIT_THR HIS ST V.S. MUC  24   2     19      113.0  0.481      5.000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: MIT_MEM Diff NS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                     N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                              N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
MIT_MEM Diff NS ST V.S. MUC  23   3     20       82.0  0.401     -7.500 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: MIT_MEM Diff HIS ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
MIT_MEM Diff HIS ST V.S. MUC  24   2     20       87.0  0.514     -5.000 
*Compare the different between the Cases with same modelling technique when 
estimating the usage of diagrams, textual description and memory. 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff THR_DIAG ST NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff THR_DIAG ST NS V.S. HIS  24   2     21       50.5  0.025     -15.00 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff THR_DIAG MUC NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                       N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                                N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff THR_DIAG MUC NS V.S. HIS  24   2     21       74.0  0.154     -15.00 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff THR_TXT ST NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                     N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                              N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff THR_TXT ST NS V.S. HIS  24   2     24      197.5  0.179      10.00 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff THR_TXT MUC NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff THR_TXT MUC NS V.S. HIS  24   2     22      209.5  0.007      15.00 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff THR_MEM ST NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                     N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                              N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff THR_MEM ST NS V.S. HIS  24   2     20      116.5  0.681      5.000 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff THR_MEM MUC NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon           Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P       Median 
Diff THR_MEM MUC NS V.S. HIS  24   2     22      130.0  0.922  0.000000000 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_DIAG ST NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff MIT_DIAG ST NS V.S. HIS  24   2     20       85.0  0.467     -5.000 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_DIAG MUC NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                       N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                                N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff MIT_DIAG MUC NS V.S. HIS  23   3     19       47.0  0.056     -10.00 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_TXT ST NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                     N for   Wilcoxon           Estimated 
                              N  N*   Test  Statistic      P       Median 
Diff MIT_TXT ST NS V.S. HIS  24   2     20      108.0  0.926  0.000000000 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_TXT MUC NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff MIT_TXT MUC NS V.S. HIS  23   3     20      130.0  0.360      5.000 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_THR ST NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                     N for   Wilcoxon           Estimated 
                              N  N*   Test  Statistic      P       Median 
Diff MIT_THR ST NS V.S. HIS  24   2     21      108.5  0.821  0.000000000 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_THR MUC NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff MIT_THR MUC NS V.S. HIS  23   3     19      126.5  0.212      10.00 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_MEM ST NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                     N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                              N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff MIT_MEM ST NS V.S. HIS  24   2     21      110.0  0.862     -5.000 
* Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff MIT_MEM MUC NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff MIT_MEM MUC NS V.S. HIS  23   3     22      116.5  0.758     -5.000 
 
4. Perception – post-questionnaire 
Descriptive Statistics: PU_1, PU_2, PU_3, PU_4 (ST) 
Variable   N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum     Q1  Median     Q3  Maximum 
PU_1      50   0  2.060    0.126  0.890    1.000  1.000   2.000  2.000    4.000 
PU_2      50   0  3.220    0.132  0.932    1.000  3.000   3.000  4.000    4.000 
PU_3      50   0  3.300    0.104  0.735    1.000  3.000   3.000  4.000    4.000 
PU_4      50   0  3.040    0.162  1.142    1.000  2.000   4.000  4.000    4.000 
Descriptive Statistics: ITU_1, ITU_2, ITU_3, ITU_4 (ST) 
Variable   N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum     Q1  Median     Q3  Maximum 
ITU_1     50   0  2.940    0.129  0.913    1.000  2.000   3.000  4.000    4.000 
ITU_2     50   0  2.880    0.130  0.918    1.000  2.000   3.000  4.000    4.000 
ITU_3     50   0  2.840    0.141  0.997    1.000  2.000   3.000  4.000    4.000 
ITU_4     50   0  2.640    0.124  0.875    1.000  2.000   2.500  3.000    4.000 
Descriptive Statistics: PEOU_1, PEOU_2, PEOU_3, PEOU_4 (ST) 
Variable   N  N*   Mean  SE Mean  StDev  Minimum     Q1  Median     Q3  Maximum 
PEOU_1    50   0  2.880    0.130  0.918    1.000  2.000   3.000  4.000    4.000 
PEOU_2    50   0  2.880    0.133  0.940    1.000  2.000   3.000  4.000    4.000 
PEOU_3    50   0  2.960    0.118  0.832    1.000  2.750   3.000  4.000    4.000 
PEOU_4    50   0  2.800    0.121  0.857    1.000  2.000   3.000  3.000    4.000 
Compare the different of perceived usefulness between ST and MUC. 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff PU1 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                          N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                       N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff PU1 ST V.S. MUC  50     30      345.0  0.021     0.5000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff PU2 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                          N for   Wilcoxon           Estimated 
                       N   Test  Statistic      P       Median 
Diff PU2 ST V.S. MUC  50     26       99.0  0.054  0.000000000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff PU3 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                          N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                       N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff PU3 ST V.S. MUC  50     30      427.0  0.000     0.5000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff PU4 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                          N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                       N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff PU4 ST V.S. MUC  50     38      678.0  0.000      1.000 
Compare the different of intended to use between ST and MUC. 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff ITU1 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                           N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                        N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff ITU1 ST V.S. MUC  50     39      690.5  0.000      1.000 
 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff ITU2 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                           N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                        N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff ITU2 ST V.S. MUC  50     35      525.0  0.001     0.5000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff ITU3 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                           N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                        N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff ITU3 ST V.S. MUC  50     33      514.0  0.000      1.000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff ITU4 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                           N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                        N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff ITU4 ST V.S. MUC  50     34      561.0  0.000      1.000 
Compare the different of perceive ease of use between ST and MUC. 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff PEOU1 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                            N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                         N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff PEOU1 ST V.S. MUC  50     41      816.5  0.000      1.500 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff PEOU2 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                            N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                         N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff PEOU2 ST V.S. MUC  50     40      764.0  0.000      1.000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff PEOU3 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                            N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                         N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff PEOU3 ST V.S. MUC  50     30      388.5  0.001     0.5000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff PEOU4 ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                            N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                         N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff PEOU4 ST V.S. MUC  50     35      490.0  0.004     0.5000 
Compare the different of average perceived perceptions between ST and MUC. 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff Average_PU ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                         N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                      N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff PU ST V.S. MUC  50     45      970.0  0.000     0.5000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff Average_ITU ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                          N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                       N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff ITU ST V.S. MUC  50     46      994.0  0.000     0.8750 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff Average_PEOU ST V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                           N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                        N   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff PEOU ST V.S. MUC  50     43      899.0  0.000     0.8750 
 
 
 
 
 
The Pooled standard deviation computing 
MUC     ST     
pooled 
standard 
deviation 
Pooled Mean 
(that took Ns 
into 
consideration) 
Average 
of the 
two 
means 
mean n SD mean n SD 
  
  2.5 50 0.36 3.01 50 0.42 0.39 2.75500 2.755 
2.18 50 0.54 3.06 50 0.70 0.63 2.62000 2.62 
2.13 50 0.54 3.02 50 0.72 0.64 2.57500 2.575 
2.34 50 0.51 3.03 50 0.62 0.57 2.68500 2.685 
Sample Size Calculation:  
0.05,1 0.80α β= − = . 
2 2 2
1 2
2
1 2
( )*( )
( )
sd sdN
Mean Mean
α β+ +
=
−  
Compare the different of perception between the cases with the same modelling 
technique. 
ST:
 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff AVER.PU.ST NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                    N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                             N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff AVER.PUST NS V.S. HIS  24   2     19       13.5  0.001    -0.3750 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff ST.AVER. ITU NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                       N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                                N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff ST.AVER. ITU NS V.S. HIS  24   2     24      185.5  0.317     0.1250 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff ST.AVER. PEOU NS V.S. MUC  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                        N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                                 N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff ST.AVER. PEOU NS V.S. MUC  24   2     23      185.0  0.157     0.3750 
MUC: 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff AVER.MUC.PU NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                      N for   Wilcoxon           Estimated 
                               N  N*   Test  Statistic      P       Median 
Diff AVER.MUC.PU NS V.S. HIS  24   2     20      124.0  0.490  0.000000000 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff AVER.MUC.ITU NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                       N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                                N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff AVER.MUC.ITU NS V.S. HIS  24   2     18      112.0  0.258     0.1250 
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test: Diff AVER.MUC.PEOU NS V.S. HIS  
Test of median = 0.000000 versus median not = 0.000000 
                                        N for   Wilcoxon         Estimated 
                                 N  N*   Test  Statistic      P     Median 
Diff AVER.MUC.PEOU NS V.S. HIS  24   2     22      205.5  0.011     0.3750 
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A Comparative Review of i*-based and Use Case-based Security Mod-
elling Initiatives
Abstract Security requirements elicitation and modelling are integral for the successful
development of secure systems. However, there are a lot of similar yet not identical
approaches that currently exist for security requirements modelling, which is confusing
for researchers and practitioners hence some characterisation will be useful to give bet-
ter overview and understand advantages and disadvantages of various approaches. This
paper provides a comparative review of i*-based and use caseU˝based security modelling
initiatives, using a characterisation framework with several dimensions. Our findings show
that both categories of initiatives have significant conceptual similarities in the aspect of
modelling language and method process, and coverage of security requirements modelling
notions They have conceptual differences in terms of their capacity to support: formal and
informal approaches, threats identification and mitigation, identification of security goals,
different software engineering development methods, and software evolution.
Keywords: security requirements, security requirements modelling, i*-based mod-
elling, use-case based modelling.
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Abstract - Security requirements elicitation and modelling are 
integral for the successful development of secure systems. However, 
there are a lot of similar yet not identical approaches that currently 
exist for security requirements modelling, which is confusing for 
researchers and practitioners hence some characterisation will be 
useful to give a better overview and understanding of advantages 
and disadvantages of various approaches. This paper provides a 
comparative review of i*-based and use case–based security 
modelling initiatives, using a characterisation framework with 
several dimensions. Our findings show that both categories of 
initiatives have significant conceptual similarities in the aspect of 
modelling language and method process, and coverage of security 
requirements modelling notions. They have conceptual differences 
in the aspect of: representation perspective, kind of security 
requirements engineering activities that are supported, the quality 
of specification that is generated and the specification techniques 
used, and the degree of support for software evolution.  
Keywords- security requirements, security requirements 
modelling, i*-based modelling, use-case based modelling. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Increased scope of connectivity, interoperability, 
extendibility, and complexity of software systems has also 
amplified the threats to their security. In recent times, security 
requirements (SR) elicitation and modelling has been gaining 
increasing importance as an integral part of the development 
of secure software systems [1]. A positive trend in the field of 
security requirements engineering is the existence of many SR 
elicitation and modelling initiatives. Some of these approaches 
also appear similar but not identical, hence researchers and 
practitioners must find adequate basis to reason about them, 
apply them, combine them, and make decision for their 
adoption when necessary.  The question is:  "are there 
conceptual differences  and similarities between these SR 
modelling initiatives that could provide a better understanding 
of their capabilities, advantages and disadvantages, and 
whether they should be considered competitors (i.e., different 
approaches for the same modelling needs) or complementary 
(i.e., both approaches together covering a modelling need 
better than any of the approaches alone).”  
Two of the more prominent categories of SR modelling 
approaches are the i*-based, and the use case-based SR 
modelling initiatives. In pursuit of our motivation for this 
work, we selected to study these two categories of SR 
modelling initiatives. This is because they are based on well 
established modelling frameworks (i* Agent modelling 
framework [2] and Use Cases [3]), and have attracted 
appreciable interest in the literature, and also in practise [4]1.  
Comparisons between different modelling languages can be 
performed in several different ways. The main distinction is 
between empirical comparisons, e.g., trying both (groups of) 
techniques in controlled experiments or case studies, and 
analytical comparisons where the techniques are evaluated 
theoretically, preferably according to some pre-established 
framework. As argued in [5] these two types of evaluations go 
hand in hand. Empirical evaluations would have the advantage 
of showing how techniques perform in practice; however, 
direct comparability between two techniques is only achieved 
with a controlled experiment. The limited duration of such 
experiments means that the experimental tasks must be fairly 
simple, and only a few aspects of the candidate modelling 
languages can be assessed in each experiment. Moreover, 
empirical studies tend to be more costly than analytical 
comparisons. It therefore makes sense to start out with an 
analytical comparison, which can compare more broadly a 
number of aspects of the candidate languages. This could then 
give insights into essential differences from which to make 
hypotheses for empirical investigations. The decision in this 
paper is therefore to go for an analytical comparison. 
The next question then becomes what framework to use for 
the comparison. Often used in analytical evaluations of 
modelling languages is the BWW ontology [6], as was for 
instance applied for evaluating UML in [7]. This ontology 
focuses on the concepts found in a modelling language. 
Another effort, rather focussing on the visual representation of 
concepts, is [8]. However, both these approaches focus only 
on the modelling language (either conceptually or visually), 
not on other issues like development method, integration with 
other approaches, etc., and both of them are for evaluating 
modelling approaches in general, not specifically tailored for 
security-related modelling. A framework directly oriented 
                                                          
1
 iStar Showcase ’11, Exploring the Goals of your Systems and Businesses - 
Practical experiences with i* modelling, http://www.cs.toronto.edu/km/istar/ 
iStarShowcase_Proceedings.pdf  
